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react to changes in fundamentals, characterizing banks' additional risk-taking by requiring higher interest rates, with-
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analysis reveals that the depositors of foreign banks exert virtually no discipline either by quantity of by price. The de-
positors of state banks use quantity-based discipline mechanism, but the only significant characteristic is bank's size. 
The maturity shifts exist for time deposits but the deposit insurance system introduction reduced them significantly. The 
depositors of private domestic banks discipline their banks by quantity (choosing larger bank in terms of assets), by 
price and by switching from on-call to long-term deposits. Admittance to the deposit insurance system introduction did 
not remove this discipline moreover disciplining became even more explicit.  
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Like any other financial service market, the market for bank deposits is exposed to information 
asymmetry problems: all deposits are characterized by some probability that the bank will not be 
able to repay due to default, but the depositors' ability to change characteristics of the deposit sup-
ply in a response to excessive risk-taking is rather questionable. However The New Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel II), appeared in 2004, places particular emphasis on intrinsic regulatory mechanisms, 
generated by the market itself. The third Pillar of Basel II (along with capital adequacy and pruden-
tial supervision) relies on market discipline, stating that introduction of the requirements to disclose 
the information related to basic bank risks publicly solves the moral hazard problem by eliminating 
(at least to the certain degree) of its origin — information asymmetry. Indeed no depositors would 
bring their money to the bank of questionable liquidity and solvency they are not sure about (unless 
it offers high interest rate).  
Most of the papers that study market discipline mechanisms, can be divided into three groups ac-
cording to the definition given to the market discipline and to the nature of mechanisms exam-
ined. The authors of the first set of studies (e.g. Hannan, Hanweck, 1988; Ellis, Flannery, 1992) 
have chosen the price-based approach. The results of these studies support the hypothesis that un-
insured depositors charge higher interest rates to riskier banks because these interest rates contain 
risk premia.  
In a second set of studies (e.g. Jordan, 2000; Goldberg, Hudgins, 1996) the quantity-based approach 
is used. If bank fundamentals demonstrate greater risks, depositors tend to withdraw their fund from 
this bank, so it becomes more difficult for the bank to raise additional deposits. This approach is 
based on the assumption that in the market characterized by imperfect information the price may 
fail to reflect the degree of riskiness. In some papers (e.g. Stiglitz, Weiss, 1981; Park, Peristiani, 
1998) the authors show that under asymmetric information the debtor is disciplined by quantity 
rather then by price.  
The third set of studies (e.g. Park, 1995; Park, Peristiani, 1998) combines both approaches. The au-
thors demonstrate that riskier banks offer higher deposit interest rates but they are able to accumu-
late smaller amount of uninsured deposits. 
One more possible way to discipline the banks may be called maturity shifts: depositors may switch 
from riskier long-term deposits to less risky short-term or even on-call ones if they face additional 
risk-taking by bank. However this approach is not widespread: only Murata and Hori (2006) em-
phasize in their paper that if the depositors' discipline exists, the changes in deposit maturity struc-
ture depend on the bank fundamentals. 
The issue of the particular research interest is whether these disciplinary mechanisms really work on 
the market for personal deposits — the market, characterized by the highest degree of information 
asymmetry, as the depositors seem to be unsophisticated. Considering Russia the share of personal 
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deposits in banks' liabilities may amount up to 40%, but these bank clients may be particularly ex-
posed to a bank panic, which is able to plunge the banking system into the crisis.  
Hosono, Iwaki, Tsuru (2004) found no market discipline either by quantity or by price in Russian 
market for bank deposits (they used 1995–2002 data and did not distinguish between personal and 
corporate deposits). Karas, Pyle, Schoors (2005, 2006), on the contrary, demonstrated the existence 
of strong market discipline by quantity and weaker one by price (they used 1999–2002 data) even 
for personal deposits. Peresetsky, Karminsky, Golovan (2007), using 2002–2004 data, found ex-
plicit price-based discipline used by retail depositors.  
The main purposes of this study are the following: 
• To investigate whether any mechanism of market discipline exists in the Russian market for 
personal deposits, and if it does, which type of the mechanisms is the most articulated one 
(whether depositors punish banks for increased risks by withdrawing their deposits, requiring 
higher interest rates or by switching from long-term to short-term deposits). 
• To check up if there were any changes in depositors' sensitivity to bank fundamentals' deteriora-
tion (or improvement) after the introduction of deposit insurance system with obligatory partici-
pation and state guarantee for the amount up to 400,000 RUB (even those depositors who have 
the ability — funds, time and expertise — to discipline their banks may not do so anymore, hav-
ing the explicit guaranties of repayment). 
• To test if any characteristics of market discipline in personal deposit market depend on the fact 
that the majority of the bank's ownership is: 
o owned by the state; 
o under control of foreign financial institution. 
To test all the above-mentioned hypotheses we use the reduced-form equations (one for each disci-
plinary mechanism):  
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∆Depi,t stands for personal deposits' growth in the bank i at time t. IRi,t represents the interest 
rate, estimated by the total interest payments to individuals to the amount of individual deposits 
ratio. BFi,t–1 stands for a vector of lagged bank fundamentals of the bank i, which characterize 
its risks. Macroi,t stands for a vector of macroeconomic factors, which do not depend on banks 
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and bank fundamentals, but influence the depositors' decisions. M marks the maturity group of 
the deposits. 
To test the hypotheses connected with the ownership structure as a determinant for market disci-
pline we construct and estimate separate regressions for state banks, foreign banks and all the rest 
banks, which we call private domestic ones. 
To estimate the econometric models we use unbalanced panel bank-specific data over the period 
April 2004 – July 2006.The analysis reveals that the depositors of foreign banks exert virtually no 
discipline either by quantity of by price. The depositors of state banks use quantity-based discipline 
mechanism, but the only significant characteristic is bank's size. The maturity shifts exist for time 
deposits but the deposit insurance system introduction reduced them significantly. The depositors of 
private domestic banks discipline their banks by quantity (choosing larger bank in terms of assets), 
by price and by switching from on-call to long-term deposits. Admittance to the deposit insurance 
system introduction did not remove this discipline moreover disciplining became even more ex-
plicit. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The markets of financial services are exposed to the problems caused by information asymmetry, 
and the degree of this exposure greatly exceeds that of any other market. The market for bank de-
posits is no exception: all deposits are characterized by some — higher or lower — probability of 
default (i.e. the probability that the bank will not be able to repay deposits due to default) but the 
depositors' ability to identify this probability is rather questionable. The need for an active regula-
tory and supervisory authorities' intervention — the use of external regulatory mechanisms — 
seems to be evident. However The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), appeared in 2004, places 
particular emphasis on intrinsic regulatory mechanisms, generated by the market itself. Actually 
on the one hand there is a certain number of standards and obligatory requirements, which are 
aimed to control the riskiness of the bank operations and to ensure bank's asset liquidity and de-
posits repayment. On the other hand no depositors would bring their money to the bank of ques-
tionable liquidity and solvency they are not sure about. This observation describes the mechanism 
of market discipline — the mechanism the third Pillar of Basel II (along with capital adequacy 
and prudential supervision) relies on. The core of market discipline mentioned in Basel II is the 
fact that introduction of the requirements of public information disclosure, related to basic bank 
risks, solves the moral hazard problem by eliminating (at least to the certain degree) of its origin 
— information asymmetry. 
Can regulatory and supervision authorities fully rely on market discipline, given the new Basel 
principles are still not introduced (Russia is no exception)? Is it reasonable enough to give up using 
at least some of standards and requirements and stop developing and introducing new ones in hope 
that the market will resolve the problem itself? Do market mechanisms really work on the market 
for personal deposits — the market, characterized by the highest degree of information asymmetry? 
How did the deposit insurance system introduction influence the efficiency of these mechanisms if 
there are any at work? The aim of this paper is to shed light upon at least some of these questions. 
Thus as applied to banking industry, in particular to bank deposits, market discipline is a mecha-
nism through which private sector agents (namely depositors) implicitly control their banks, chang-
ing characteristics of the supply of time deposits in a response to increased risks undertaken by 
banks. After the period of banking crises in 1980s–1990s many economists raised a question of this 
mechanism's actual presence and its functioning in the deposit markets. The introduction of Basel II 
principles gives start to additional reflection on this topic so the number of studies in this field rose 
dramatically. Regarding to personal deposits, owned not by firms, but by individuals, this is the 
question of particular interest for many Russian banks. The share of such deposits in banks' liabili-
ties may amount to 40%, but these bank clients may be particularly exposed to a bank panic, which 
is able to plunge the banking system into the crisis. Concerning recent introduction of the deposit 
insurance system and the question of its efficiency and coverage adequacy (the share of insured de-
posits accounted for 36% before the first increase of "the ceiling" and is expected to rise up to 44% 
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after it1) the question of market discipline is important for regulation and supervision authorities. 
However the majority of theoretical and empirical papers on the topic usually do not pay enough 
attention to such crucial moments as peculiarities of market discipline in the market for personal 
time deposits or maturity structure shifts as a disciplinary mechanism.  
The main purposes of this study are the following: 
• To investigate whether any mechanism of market discipline exists in the Russian market for 
personal deposits, and if it does, which type of the mechanisms is the most articulated one 
(whether depositors punish banks for increased risks by withdrawing their deposits, requir-
ing higher interest rates or by switching from long-term to short-term or even to on-call de-
posits). 
• To check up if there were any changes in depositors' sensitivity to bank fundamentals' deteriora-
tion (or improvement) after the introduction of deposit insurance system with obligatory partici-
pation and state guarantee for the amount up to 400,000 RUB.  
• To test if any characteristics of market discipline in personal deposit market depend on: 
o  the fact that the bank is a state one; 
o  the fact that the majority of the bank's ownership is in the hands of foreign financial institu-
tion. 
The results of the study are likely to reveal, to what degree it is reasonable to rely on market disci-
pline by individual depositors (the deposit insurance system introduction points out that market 
mechanisms do not work sufficiently well). The latter problem is one of current importance: the 
process of bank selection for the state deposit insurance system came to the end, and the steps in 
direction of further "ceiling" increasing are already undertaken.  
2. DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM IN RUSSIA 
It seems to be useful to describe the principles the deposit insurance system is based on. In the very 
end of 2003 the owners of personal deposits in Russian banks obtained the state guaranty that in 
case of their bank's bankruptcy they have an opportunity to get the repayment of their funds (but not 
more than 100,000 rubles). Thus Russia joined the countries, which introduced this or that type of 
deposit insurance system — the number of these countries is now more than 90. According to the 
lawmakers' idea not earlier than in two weeks after the banks license is cancelled the depositor ap-
plying for the reimbursement should send a request to the Deposit Insurance Agency. The amount 
of his or her deposit (taking "the ceiling" into account) must be repaid in three days. In the same 
time the Agency takes the depositors place in the line of banks creditors. Both on-call and time per-
sonal deposits are insured, but there is no insurance for firm deposits or bank deposits.  
                                                 
1 Turbanov (2006). 
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The participation in the system is obligatory for all banks, which have a license for retail deposits 
acceptance. Banks are admitted on the base of the financial stability coefficients brought in line 
with the requirements. Per se the set of coefficients is standard: for capital adequacy, assets quality, 
management quality, earnings and liquidity, but the requirements are stricter, than those for ordinal 
check-ups. 
The financial base for the system is the fund of obligatory deposit insurance. The fund has the fol-
lowing sources of money: initial payment from the state, regular2 and penalty fees paid by member 
banks, investment income.3  
August 2006 witnessed the raise of maximum amount of compensation up to 190,000 rubles (with a 
90% coverage for amounts more than 100,000 rubles), the next step was the raise of "the ceiling" up 
to 400,000 rubles and it is expected that the coverage will continue to rise. What changes did hap-
pen with the market of personal deposits with the deposit insurance system introduction? Should we 
expect this measure to make the depositors even less sensitive to banks' risk-taking? Or this step is 
an essential one, because the market initially was not able to deal with the moral hazard problem 
itself? Can this measure aggravate the moral hazard problem because with the state guaranties the 
depositor may become oriented on the higher interest rate only and this will stimulate banks to in-
vest in riskier assets to attract additional clientele by more attractive interest payments? Thus it 
seems to be quite important to find out whether the deposit insurance system is some sort of deus ex 
machina, a guaranty of banking system stability and a provider of additional inflows if retail deposi-
tors' funds due to increased degree of trust, or the design chosen for deposit insurance does not re-
spond to the necessities of the Russian market for personal deposits and is a source of threats rather 
than benefits. Thus it is quite evident that this study seems to be appropriate and relevant in the light 
of some current reforms in Russian banking system. 
3. LITERATURE 
Most of the early papers that study market discipline mechanisms, concentrate on the experience of 
the US commercial banks and S&Ls (saving and loans associations4) in 1980s–1990s. These studies 
can be divided into three groups according to the definition given to the market discipline and to the 
nature of mechanisms examined. The authors of the first set of studies (e.g. Hannan, Hanweck, 
1988; Ellis, Flannery, 1992) have chosen the price-based approach. In particular, they examine how 
yields on deposits respond to changes in risks undertaken by banks. The results of these studies 
                                                 
2 The rate is equal for all banks. It is set by the Agency and cannot exceed 0.15% of the average quarter amount of de-
posits. 
3 The funds may be invested into government securities, deposits and securities of the Central bank, bonds and shares of 
Russian corporations, Russian mortgage securities, shares of index unit investment trusts, investing into foreign gov-
ernment securities, bonds and shares of foreign corporations, other securities of developed countries. 
4 For simplicity hereinafter they are called "banks", but legally they are not. 
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support the hypothesis that uninsured depositors charge higher interest rates to riskier banks be-
cause these interest rates contain risk premia.  
In a second set of studies (e.g. Jordan, 2000; Goldberg, Hudgins, 1996) the quantity-based approach 
is used. If bank fundamentals demonstrate greater risks, depositors tend to withdraw their fund from 
this bank, so it becomes more difficult for the bank to raise additional deposits. This approach is 
based on the assumption that in the market characterized by imperfect information the price may 
fail to reflect the degree of riskiness. In some papers (e.g. Stiglitz, Weiss, 1981; Park, Peristiani, 
1998) the authors show that under asymmetric information the debtor is disciplined by quantity 
rather then by price.  
The third set of studies (e.g. Park, 1995; Park, Peristiani, 1998) combines both approaches. The au-
thors demonstrate that riskier banks offer higher deposit interest rates but they are able to accumu-
late smaller amount of uninsured deposits. 
The case studies dedicated to the presence of market discipline in other countries become more and 
more numerous now. The existence of market discipline was proved for developed countries (e.g. 
for Switzerland Birchler, Maechler, 2001; or Japan Murata, Hori, 2006), as well as for some devel-
oping countries: Argentine, Chile, Mexico (Martinez Peria, Schmuckler, 1999, 2001), Bolivia (Io-
annidou, de Dreu, 2006), Colombia (Barajas, Steiner, 2000), India (Ghosh, Abhiman), Turkey (Un-
gan, Caner), Uruguay (Goday, Gruss, 2005). Notably they show that market discipline exists even 
in the market for small insured deposits. "All-around-the-globe" studies (Demirgüc-Kunt, Huizinga, 
1999; Hosono, Iwaki, Tsuru, 2004) allow making some cross-country comparison. They prove that 
quantity-based approach is more appropriate for developing economies, where due to asymmetry of 
information and lack of transparency of financial markets the interest rates are unlikely to reflect all 
the information about bank risks, and for developed countries a mix approaches should be used. It is 
worth noting that these conclusions should be taken into account those planning a new research 
work in this field. So lack of market discipline (for example found in New Zealand Wilson, Rose, 
Pinfold, 2004) may be explained by the fact that some possible mechanisms were not tested for 
presence (Wilson, Rose and Pinfold limited their analysis to the price-based mechanism), not by 
absence of incentives and opportunities for depositor discipline. 
Hosono, Iwaki, Tsuru (2004) found no market discipline either by quantity or by price in Russian 
market for bank deposits (they used 1995–2002 data). Karas, Pyle, Schoors (2005, 2006), on the 
contrary, demonstrated the existence of strong market discipline by quantity and weaker one by 
price (they used 1999–2002 data). The discipline was likely to become more intense after the finan-
cial collapse of 1998 and to be more pronounced for corporate depositors. Although our study is 
based on another data set and uses other model specifications placing particular emphasis on the 
influence of institutional factors change (e.g. deposit insurance system introduction), there still is 
the case study it is possible to compare the results with. Finally Peresetsky, Karminsky, Golovan 
(2007), using 2002–2004 data, found explicit price-based discipline used by retail depositors 
In addition to already mentioned criterion it's worth distinguishing all the papers according to 
econometric models estimated. This division is important because it helps to understand why the 
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model presented by this paper was chosen. Before the papers by Martinez Peria, Schmuckler (1999, 
2001) were published the authors estimated dependent variables in two steps. The fist one is the de-
termination of the probability of bank failure. The second one is constructing the estimate of de-
pendent variables according to this probability and some factors, which are not related to the bank 
fundamentals. Martinez Peria and Schmuckler reasonably noted that this approach fails to demon-
strate explicitly, whether the changes of dependent variables were caused mostly by some particular 
bank fundamental, so they offered to use a one step model. This approach is used by most of their 
followers that is why our study contains econometric model, which explicitly demonstrates the rela-
tionship between dependent variable and the bank fundamentals as well as macroeconomic charac-
teristics.  
It's worth reminding that the study is dedicated to personal deposits, so we use them as a dependent 
variable in measuring the quantity-based mechanism. These deposits are not emphasized in earlier 
papers, but taking into account that recently introduced deposit insurance system covers only per-
sonal deposits, this causes the particular interest for the research work.  
The authors usually consider the quantity-based mechanism as the changes in the total amount of 
deposits, however the absence of market discipline for total amount may be explained by shifts in 
their maturity structure. This modification of the mechanism suggests that the depositors shift their 
preferences in favor of short-term deposits or even on-call deposits in response to higher bank risks. 
As Murata and Hori (2006) emphasize in their paper, if the depositors' discipline exists, the changes 
in deposit maturity structure depend on the bank fundamentals, which characterize the risk associ-
ated with a bank. However Murata, Hori (2006) is the only paper to check this hypothesis. In this 
paper the difference in quantity-based mechanisms for different type of deposits are estimated as 
well as the functioning of maturity shifts mechanism, using the idea and some instruments offered 
in Murata, Hori (2006). 
The final remark is that the majority of empirical literature on market discipline does not divide all 
banks into several groups on the criterion of the ownership structure or on any other basis. Only in 
Birchler, Maechler (2001), the authors compare the characteristics of market discipline for cantonal 
and regional Swiss banks. But this subdivision is explained by differences in deposit insurance 
schemes used by banks from different groups (cantonal banks enjoy the advantage of special state 
guaranty). However the ownership structure itself could be the signal of riskiness or reliability of 
the bank. That may cause for example the absence of market discipline for the clients of state banks. 
In the same time there appears the possibility to compare foreign and state banks in this respect. For 
example in India there is weak market discipline for foreign banks, not for the state ones, and in 
New Zealand, where market discipline was not found, the banks mostly are not domestic, too.  
There are some papers examining the role of deposit insurance system and its influence on the bank 
deposit market. The authors use to emphasize two general purposes of this system introduction. An 
ex-post purpose is to create a tool, which would help to repay the deposits (fully or at least partly) in 
case of bank bankruptcy. An ex-ante purpose is to provide banking system stability, namely — to 
prevent the so-called bank runs, performed by depositors. In Diamond, Dybvig (1983) the authors 
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show that from a depositor's point of view the strategy to run a bank — i.e. to come and withdraw 
deposit before it matures — is a preferable one. If a depositor expects other depositors to withdraw 
their funds earlier he or she will prefer to act in the same way. Thus the clients who arrived first 
face no losses, but those who are a bit late get nothing because the bank is defaulted.  
It is not surprising therefore that the banks have incentives to invest into liquid assets — that results 
in drop of bank activities' profitability and lack of industrial sector financing — and, in the same 
time, to control the information available to depositors (in order not to give them the signal to begin 
a bank run).  
As the route of such financial crises development is like a spiral and the mechanism is self-
sustainable, the regulatory authorities may prevent them at a very early stage and on individual bank 
level (using prudential supervision techniques), and even those measures may be insufficient be-
cause the gossips on bank insolvency may arise without any control and are enough to stimulate a 
bank run. Deposit insurance systems seem to be a more efficient tool in bank runs prevention, as 
they reduce the incentives to withdraw the deposits.  
As the author of Thompson (2001) highlights there are several groups of agents who definitely 
benefit from deposit insurance system introduction. First of all these are small depositors as regula-
tors and/or insurance fund managers are able to perform the monitoring of banks more effectively 
than they do, as they have much more expertise. Secondly small banks are those who benefit, too. 
Deposit insurance introduction make them more competitive as implicit guaranties provided by 
state or foreign support as well as "too-big-to fail" hypothesis is not a competitive advantage any 
more. However the degree of this rise of competitiveness depends upon the share of the deposits in 
bank resources. At last the taxpayers are those who may gain benefits, too. As the deposit insurance 
system introduction reduces the probability of a bank run the probability that the state will have to 
spend the budget funds including collected taxes to liquidate the consequences of financial crisis 
decreases as well.  
The main problem created by deposit insurance is the problem of moral hazard. Even those deposi-
tors who have the ability — funds, time and expertise — to monitor banks effectively will not do so 
anymore: why to spend the resources if even in case of bank bankruptcy the insurance fund will be 
the source of deposit repayment anyway. So the financial results of banking activities, as well as the 
corresponding level of risks, are not interesting for them now. Consequently the only factor that in-
fluences the choice of a bank to invest money is the offered interest rates. In the same time the 
banks enjoying the absence of market discipline prefer to invest the accumulated funds into riskier 
projects. This allows to yield more (at a price of higher risks), on the one hand, and to offer higher 
interest rates providing a competitive advantage to a bank in such a situation on the other hand. 
Therefore the tool aimed to provide banking system stability may have an opposite effect if the de-
posit insurance system introduction reduces the incentives to exert market discipline to zero. 
However the reduction of market discipline by deposit insurance system introduction is what nu-
merous case studies demonstrate. For example in Ioannidou, de Dreu (2006) the authors show that 
deposit insurance introduction in Bolivia seriously undermined market discipline, especially when 
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the coverage was raised higher than 60%. In Hoggarth, Jackson, Nier and in Hosono (2004) a hand-
ful of papers proving this idea are mentioned. However Hosono (2004), examining the case of Ja-
pan, in particular, the period of banking crisis, comes to the conclusion that the depositors respond 
to the banking risks even under explicit guaranties. In Davenport, McDill (2005), the authors ana-
lyze the market discipline on micro-level (examining only one bank's data) and find out that insured 
retail depositors discipline the bank even more intensive than uninsured ones. The paper contains 
the review of studies with the same conclusions. So in generic case the definition of market disci-
pline as a reaction of uninsured depositors to excessive bank risk-taking, although rarely used (e.g. 
in Nier, Bauman, 2003), may be quite questionable. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. The Data 
The majority of the data that is used in the study is the data reported by the Central bank of Russian 
Federation. The website www.cbr.ru contains Russian banks financial statement data sets (balance 
sheets and profit and loss accounts5). The information of the balance sheets is reported on a monthly 
basis, the data of the profit and loss account — on a quarterly basis. The currently available data 
covers the period from 1st of April 2004, to 1st of July 2006. The majority of financial statements 
contain all the information necessary to model variables calculation (the variables will be described 
later). 
Table 1 contains the information about the number of banks, for which the financial statements are 
available (the number of banks is different for each quarter). The absence of information for a num-
ber of banks may be caused by different factors. First of all, although reporting the information of 
the financial statements (and lots of other reports and — as it is called in Russian —"forms") to the 
Central bank is obligatory, public reporting on the site is voluntary, though recommended by the 
Central bank (that is why the number of banks gradually increase). Secondly, some of the banks 
publish only the balance sheets (nearly 6.3% of banks) and some of them publish only profit and 
loss accounts (less than 1%), so we have no access to the full data, necessary for variable construc-
tion. Unbalanced bank-specific panel data is used in the analysis in order to cover as many banks as 
possible including those, which were operating for some time, but not during the whole two years 
taken into account (they are mainly new banks).  
Although the financial statements are published by the Central bank, of course, one might reasona-
bly doubt whether the information is a trustworthy. The case is that the quality of data is a matter of 
the accountant and his or her incentives and abilities for window-dressing as well. But the data can-
not be checked by any additional means, because more precise information is available only for the 
bank managers, not for outside users and sometimes not even for the Central bank. So it is assumed 
                                                 
5 The so-called form 101 and form 102. 
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that the data is reliable. Moreover this is what the depositor may obtain, and it is one more impor-
tant reason to admit this data. Most of the ratings and rankings published by mass media or rating 
agencies are based on this particular data. So a depositor makes the decision taking this information 
— not the internal one — into account. 
Table 1. Number of banks 
 All banks State banks Foreign banks Private domestic banks 
3q. 2004 417 8 8 401 
4q. 2004 414 8 8 398 
1q. 2005 435 10 10 415 
2q. 2005 467 10 8 449 
3q. 2005 468 9 9 450 
4q. 2005 465 8 10 447 
1q. 2006 467 7 11 449 
2q. 2006 506 11 17 478 
The research work is also based on some macroeconomic characteristics. These are the factors, 
which are not bank fundamentals, but they describe the economical situation in whole and therefore 
influence the depositor decision-making process. They include the changes in disposable income 
and in consumer price index, EUR/RUB and USD/RUB exchange rates. Some information is re-
ported by the Central bank as well, the data on the rest of characteristics is available in the Federal 
Service of Statistics (Федеральная служба государственной статистики) paper "Short-run Eco-
nomic Indices for the Russian Federation" (available data covers the period from 1999 to July 
2006).  
4.2. Econometric model 
As a general form of econometric model the following reduced-form equations are used in the study 
(we mark this model as Specification 1): 
 , , , 1 , , ,i t I i I i t I t I i tIR BF Macroα µ γ ε−′ ′= + + +  (1) 
 , , , 1 , , ,i t D i D i t D t D i tDep BF Macroα µ γ ε−′ ′∆ = + + +  (2) 
such that i = 1, …, N; N — the number of banks in the sample; t = 1, …, T; T — the number of ob-
servations.  
∆Depi,t stands for personal deposits' growth6 in the bank i at time t. IRi,t represents the interest rate, 
estimated by the total interest payments to individuals to the amount of individual deposits ratio. 
                                                 
6 As Ioannidou, de Dreu (2006) suggests the levels depend more on bank characteristics, than on supply and demand 
equality conditions, moreover, the levels may be biased to balance equality of assets and liabilities. That is why the 
growth is used.  
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
15
We have no opportunity to obtain the rates offered by the banks7, so this ratio seems to be an appro-
priate estimation. The authors, who used the same ratio, have called it "the implicit interest rate" 
(e.g. Ungan, Caner). BFi,t–1 stands for a vector of bank fundamentals of the bank i, which character-
ize its risks. The information reaches the depositors later than the reporting date, so this vector is 
included into regression with a lag (this lag is approximately two months that is why regressing on 
the previous period variables seems to be quite reasonable). Macroi,t stands for a vector of macro-
economic factors, which do not depend on banks and bank fundamentals, but influence the deposi-
tors' decisions. These variables are included without any lag because the depositors tend to take into 
account the current economic situation, not the previous period one.  
The following section will examine the nature and the methods of calculation for every variable in-
cluded into the vectors of explanatory variables. Also some hypotheses, which are tested in the 
study, will be formulated.  
The level of bank risk is characterized by the variables chosen using the principles of CAMEL rat-
ing system, which includes Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity. 
It is also necessary to include the measure for bank size into regression (an appropriate estimation is 
bank assets).  
All bank fundamentals and expected influence on dependent variables8 are represented in Table 2: 
Table 2. Bank fundamentals 
Variable 
Expected 
influence on 
change in 
deposits* 
Interpretation 
ddep Change in personal deposits (total) –  
ir Interest rate (Total interest payments  
to individuals/Total personal deposits) 
–  
Capital adequacy  
ca Capital to total assets ratio – (+) The higher the ratio the more reliable the bank 
is considered to be 
Asset quality  
bln Loans written off as bad ones to total 
assets ratio 
– (+) The higher the ratio the riskier bank's operations 
are considered to be 
cln Consumer loans to total assets ratio – or +  
(+ or –)  
On the one hand, consumer credits are relatively 
small and easy to recall, on the other hand the 
methods used to reveal the borrower's 
creditworthiness are not perfect at all, and 
sometimes these loans use no collateral, so the 
influence may be either positive or negative 
nibc Interbank loans (granted minus 
obtained) to total assets ratio  
– (+) In the case of financial crisis the market for 
interbank loans usually collapses first 
                                                 
7 The banks are too numerous and each of them may offer different types of deposit "products" characterizing by differ-
ent interest rates even for deposits of the same maturity. 
8 It is worth noting that the expected influence of the majority of variables may be explained not only by banking the-
ory, but by simple market discipline models (e.g. Hosono, Iwaki, Tsuru, 2004). 
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Variable 
Expected 
influence on 
change in 
deposits* 
Interpretation 
Management quality 
niexp Net non-interest expenses (minus net 
non-interest expenses related to 
operations with securities and foreign 
currency)** to total assets ratio 
– or + 
(+ or –) 
On the one hand, the rise of the ratio may be 
caused by a decline in efficiency of 
management (in this case the relationship will 
be negative), on the other hand, the expenses 
may increase because of new service 
development, existing service quality 
improvement or advertisement campaign (if so, 
the relationship is likely to be positive) 
Earnings and profitability 
roa Return on assets ratio (the net gain to 
total assets ratio) 
+ (–) The higher the ratio the more efficient the bank 
is considered to be 
Liquidity  
la Most liquid assets (cash and current 
accounts (sometimes called 
correspondent accounts)) to total assets 
+ (–) The higher this ratio, the smaller the probability, 
that the bank will face some liquidity problems 
Bank size  
lna Natural logarithm of bank's assets + (–) The bigger the bank, the higher the reliability it 
is associated with is (this corresponds to the 
"too big to fail hypothesis") 
* — For interest rate the expected influence is reported in brackets. 
** — Thus the variable covers the expenses that characterize bank efficiency: wages and salaries, overheads, maintenance expenses, 
other expenses related to daily routine.  
It is important to keep in mind that balance sheets contain the data of stock type (i.e. given on a par-
ticular date) and the information in profit and loss accounts is of flow type (given for a period of 
time). To construct the ratios using both types of characteristics is not correct thus in Table 2 assets, 
capital, written-off debts, consumer and interbank loans, liquid assets, foreign funds — the charac-
teristics taken from balance sheets — are related to their average meaning in a particular quarter. 
Macroeconomic variables — different characteristics, which are external for banks — are essential 
for the research work: being control variables they help to determine in what degree changes in de-
posits are dependent on bank fundamentals, not on other factors, produced by the economy as a 
whole. In this study several factors are included into the model, Table 3 contains the information 
about them.  
The general model is used to answer some particular questions therefore it is needed to emphasize 
the specifications that are used in this study.  
To test for market discipline existence before and after introduction of the deposit insurance system 
it is needed to differentiate between these two periods. However considering these periods to be the 
same for all banks and estimating separate regressions for both periods does not seem to be an ap-
propriate way. The case is that the process of banks admittance to the system de jure began in the 
very beginning of 2004 but de facto lasted until the end of 2005. Thus in any period with the excep-
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tion of the first and two last quarters there were the banks, which were already in the list if Deposit 
Insurance Agency and which were not (see Fig. 1).  
Table 3. Macroeconomic variables 
Variable 
Expected 
influence on 
change in deposits 
Interpretation 
income Disposable income  
of the individuals per capita 
+ The richer an individual the more funds he/she 
is ready to deposit 
infl Change of consumer price index – or + 
 
According to the intertemporal theory of 
consumption (I. Fisher) an increase in prices 
results into the growth of savings (price increase 
explains an increase in nominal interest rate), 
but a further price growth leads to reduction of 
deposits' attractiveness (the consumption in 
current period of time becomes more attractive 
— or, better to say, simply needs more funds) 
ee EUR/RUB exchange rate – or + 
de USD/RUB exchange rate  – or + 
This variable characterizes the alternative ways 
to invest savings. On the other hand, the 
deposits include deposits in foreign currency as 
well. According to the accounting standards 
they are converted into rubles to be reflected in 
balance sheets. So the influence of exchange 
rates is also expressed in changes in their value 
in rubles (the interest payment include those 
paid for deposits in foreign currency as well)  
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Fig. 1. Share of banks in DIS (%) 
The information from this list related to the dates of admittance allows us to construct a Dummy-
variable, which equals to 1 for the quarters the bank operating under a mark "The deposits are in-
sured" and is equal to 0 for all the rest quarters. Thus we obtain two separate sets of observations: 
with Dummy = 0 and with Dummy = 1. To examine the effect of deposit insurance system intro-
duction the following modification of the initial model is estimated (we mark it as Specification 2): 
 , , , 1 , 1 , ,_ * _ * ,i t I i I i t I t I i t I t I i tIR BF Macro Dummy DIS BF Dummy DIS Macroα µ γ θ ϑ ε− −′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + +  (3) 
 
, , , 1 , 1
, ,
_ *
_ * .
i t D i D i t D t D i t
D t D i t
Dep BF Macro Dummy DIS BF
Dummy DIS Macro
α µ γ θ
ϑ ε
− −′ ′ ′∆ = + + + +
′+ +  (4) 
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To test the hypotheses connected with the ownership structure as an explanatory variable for deposit 
changes and as a determinant for market discipline it is needed to construct and estimate separate 
regressions for state banks (to obtain the effect of state property), for foreign banks (to obtain the 
effect of foreign property) and for all the rest banks, which we call private domestic ones.  
The group of state banks includes the banks with the share of state ownership9 exceeding 50%. Af-
ter the exclusion of state banks from the sample, market discipline mechanisms are expected to be-
come more articulated, at least before deposit insurance system introduction. State banks were con-
sidered to be the most reliable ones without any explicit guaranties; they are likely to continue ex-
ploiting such an image after admittance to the system. 
Using the notion "foreign bank" we consider the banks with more than 50% of foreign owner-
ship.10 Foreign banks proved to be reliable after the crisis of 1998. Although foreign banks are 
permitted to operate in Russia only by establishing subsidiaries — and de jure the parent bank is 
not responsible for the subsidiary's obligations in case of default — there may exist some mecha-
nisms of implicit insurance: the depositors seem to believe that a parent bank will not let the sub-
sidiary to sink (this may be explained by the fact that they may be not aware of the absence of this 
responsibility). So the expected market discipline and its changes over time are less explicit for 
this group of banks.  
Excluding them from the sample allows concentrating on the most interesting group of banks — 
private domestic banks. Before their admittance to the system there was neither explicit guaranty 
of deposit repayment, nor state or foreign support in banking activities. Hence after the admit-
tance depositors' sensitivity to bank risks — if any existed — is likely to decrease due to appear-
ance of the guaranty of the certain amount repayment. Separate regressions will allow testing all 
above-mentioned hypotheses and bring to light the deposits dependence on the bank's ownership 
structure.  
In order to control the degree of competition among banks the market share might be included into 
the model as additional bank fundamental. But there is virtually no global competition in the market 
due to Sberbank dominance (regional banks are likely to compete with its branches, not with each 
other). There may be some on the regional level, but the information of branches' financial state-
ments is restricted (being available only to the Central bank).  
In order to examine the mechanism of maturity shifts two types of models are estimated in this pa-
per. In attempt to reveal quantitative maturity shifts we estimate the system of regressions (we mark 
them as Specification 3):  
 tiDtDtiDiDti
M MacroBFDep ,,1,,, εγµα +′+′+=∆ − , (5) 
M — maturity of deposits. 
                                                 
9 The ownership of local authorities is also considered to be the "state" one. 
10 Most of them are subsidiaries of foreign financial institution or banks bought by foreign financial institution, so the 
foreign ownership accounts for 100%. 
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The system with Dummy-variable for deposit insurance introduction is estimated separately as well 
(Specification 3a): 
 , , , 1 , 1 , ,_ * _ *
M
i t D i D i t D t D i t D t D i tDep BF Macro Dummy DIS BF Dummy DIS Macroα µ γ θ ϑ ε− −′ ′ ′ ′∆ = + + + + + , (6) 
M — maturity of deposits. 
These regressions may help to find out whether excessive risk-taking results into shifts of the bank's 
clients' investments to short-term or on-call deposits. If the depositors of riskier banks prefer to 
change the maturity of their deposits to shorter one and those of less risky ones do not behave this 
way the disciplinary mechanism of maturity shifts should be considered as a functioning one.11  
To test these hypotheses but in terms of the shares of different deposit categories the systems of fol-
lowing equations are used (we mark them as Specification 4 and 4a respectively): 
 tiDtDtiDiD
ti
ti
M
MacroBF
Dep
Dep
,,1,,
,
, εγµα +′+′+=∆ − , (7) 
 
,
, , 1 , 1
,
, ,
_ *
_ * ,
M
i t
D i D i t D t D i t
i t
D t D i t
Dep
BF Macro Dummy DIS BF
Dep
Dummy DIS Macro
α µ γ θ
ϑ ε
− −′ ′ ′∆ = + + + +
′+ +
 (8) 
M — maturity of deposits. 
If the depositor discipline does not exist the coefficients of bank fundamentals will be found insig-
nificant. If the mechanism is at work riskier banks will witness an increase in shares of on-call and 
short-term deposits and a decrease of shares of long-term deposits.  
According to accounting principles, there are seven categories of deposits: on-call and time deposits 
(up to 30 days, from 31 to 90 days, from 91 to 180 days, from 181 days to 1 year (365 days), from 1 
year (366 days) to 3 years and more than 3 years). Each bank does not necessarily have all these cate-
gories of deposits. Fig. 2 demonstrates the percentage of banks, which have in their balance sheets this 
or that deposit category. In order to make the empirical analysis close to theoretical hypotheses, as 
well as to preserve an appropriate number of observations, seven categories are grouped into three 
broader ones: on-call deposits, short-term deposits (up to 180 days), and long-term deposits (181 days 
and more). Specifications 3 and 4 are estimated for each of these deposit categories.  
5. MODEL ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION 
5.1. All deposits 
Descriptive statistics 
Fig. 3 demonstrates how the market shares of different groups of banks were changing during the 
period of time we are interested in: from the third quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2006. 
                                                 
11 E.g. Murata, Horo (2006). 
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Table 21 in Appendix A1 contains the summary statistics for all variables, which allows gaining 
some insight into the data related to all the bank groups. Some observations were excluded due to 
significant mistakes in reported data.12  
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Fig. 2. Percentage of banks for each deposit category 
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Fig. 3. State, foreign and private domestic banks: market share over time 
Majority of the personal deposits are the deposits in the state banks. However during the period of 
active admittance of banks to the deposit insurance system, as well as during the first two quarters 
of 2006 the market share of state banks is gradually decreasing: in the third quarter of 2004 this 
share accounts for 75.3% of the total personal deposits and in the second quarter of 2006 the share 
is 65.6%, being reduced by 9.7 percentage points. The foreign banks' market share rose from 1.2% 
to 5.2%, and the market share of private domestic banks increased by 6.8 percentage points — from 
23.5% to 29.1%. This observation signals the fact that the deposit insurance system introduction 
                                                 
12 The observation is considered to contain a serious mistake if at least one of the following is true: ir>1, ca<0, ca>1, 
nibc<–1, nibc>1, ffn>1. 
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improved the competitiveness of non-state banks, extending the state guaranties to all banks operat-
ing on the market of private bank deposits.  
Looking at Table 21 in Appendix A1 we may emphasize some important facts, although the stan-
dard deviation is high and difference between minimum and maximum meanings is even higher. As 
it may be expected compared with all other groups of banks the average total assets are higher for 
state ones. But it is worth noting that among foreign banks (e.g. Moscow International bank, Raif-
feisenbank Austria) as well as among private domestic banks (e.g. Alpha-bank, Uralsib) there are 
banks, which have the total assets that are comparable with those of Sberbank. Nevertheless the to-
tal deposits of these large private banks are still much lower than those in state banks, the same is 
true for the average growth of total deposits over time. 
The highest average interest rate is offered by private domestic banks, although the average deposit 
growth for them is lower than that for other groups. In the same time the minimum average interest 
rate is offered by foreign banks, the rate is surprisingly lower than that of state banks. The rate of 
state banks is usually close to that of private domestic banks or lower. This state of affairs, as well 
as that related to deposit and deposit growth, does not change much over time. 
At this stage it is also possible to make a draft estimation of the level of risks associated with the 
banks of this or that group. Private domestic banks are characterized by higher proportion of written-
off debts in total assets and this state of affairs lead us to reasonable suspicion that private domestic 
banks do not do their best to screen the potential borrowers and to choose the best ones, or they have 
to deal with less reliable borrowers as all the rest are attracted by state and foreign banks. The suspi-
cion becomes more serious given the fact that the share of consumer loans is lower as this proportion 
in foreign banks' assets. The situation improves, however: considering the very last quarter — the 
second quarter of 2006 — the average share of written-off loans is virtually the same for state, foreign 
and private domestic banks: 0.6%, 0.5% and 0.8% respectively. Descriptive statistics for all other 
bank fundamentals however do not allow making some conclusion on overall riskiness of this or that 
group of banks, but we may consider the share of bad loans to be a "dirty" measure of the risk and 
conclude on this stage that we have obtained as an implicit signal of the fact that the depositors are 
attracted by reliability of a bank, and less reliable banks have to offer higher interest rates. 
Thus what we can observe is the inflow of individual deposits to foreign banks and comparatively 
risky private domestic banks, and state banks — the most reliable ones even in times of implicit 
guaranties — loosing their positions on the market. 
Market discipline by individual depositors 
Table 22 in Appendix A1 demonstrate the results of market discipline analysis considering the 
whole period of time we are interested in, i.e. Specification 1 estimation results. Table 4 contains 
the results of quantity-based and price-based disciplinary mechanism estimations for all banks (the 
influence of significant variables are reported13).  
                                                 
13 This influence is obtained by running a regression with the regressors that proved to be significant in the initial re-
gression estimation.  
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Table 4. Disciplining by quantity and by price: all banks 
  Additional deposit growth, thousand rubles* 
Asset growth by 1% 2973.023534 
  Change in interest rate, p.p. 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 0.0279565 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.00218 
Inflation growth by 1 percentage point –0.66763 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 3.58834 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 1.91707 
* — income is excluded (F-test (coef. for all variables equal to zero, excluding lna): p-value = 0.5993). 
During the whole studied period of time quantity-based discipline mechanism is expressed only in 
choosing larger (in terms of assets) bank: a 1% increase of total assets results in additional aver-
age inflow of nearly 3 mln. rubles of individual depositors' money. Disciplining by price seems to 
be absent.  
Considering price-based mechanism the same is true for state banks (see Table 5). The quantity-
base mechanism of market discipline proves to be at work at least to some degree. The depositors 
prefer larger banks and the corresponding effect is much higher than the average one: a 1% increase 
of total assets provides nearly 42 mln. rubles of additional deposit growth. Another bank fundamen-
tal significant in quantitative disciplining of state banks is the share of consumer loans in total as-
sets: the corresponding effect is 391 mln. rubles — the amount exceeds the additional inflow gener-
ated by an increase of assets significantly. This fact is likely to demonstrate that banks, which ac-
tively work on the whole retail market, do attract more individual depositors although higher pro-
portion of consumer loans may signal about additional risk-taking14 (as mentioned in variable de-
scription). It is worth noting that the disposable income is not a significant factor in depositors' de-
cision-making process. The existence of implicit state guaranties before deposit insurance system 
introduction, and of explicit guaranties after it, is likely to provide the incentive to prefer bank de-
posits as a way to keep savings. Put in other words, given the choice between having savings in 
form of cash at home and investing them into bank deposits the individuals choose the latter variant, 
thus some "mattress money" is transformed into bank deposits. 
For foreign banks the quantity-based mechanism is absent (the corresponding regression is not sig-
nificant, see Table 22 in Appendix A1). The disciplining by price is however is more explicit. Ta-
ble 6 demonstrates, that the banks with higher total assets and capital adequacy ratio offer lower 
interest rates — the disciplining is exercised in an expected way. The size of the corresponding ef-
fects are however low enough.  
                                                 
14 More and more experts make us sure that the next banking crisis in Russia will be related to excessive risks in con-
sumer loans granting. 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
23
Table 5. Disciplining by quantity and by price: state banks  
  Additional deposit growth, thousand rubles* 
Asset growth by 1 p.p. 42921.18 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 391000 
 Change in interest rate, p.p.* 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. –0.38716 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.00214 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 3.31051 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 1.41602 
* — bln is excluded (F-test (coef. for all variables equal to zero, excluding lna and cln): p-value = 0.5659). 
Table 6. Disciplining by price: foreign banks 
  Change in interest rate, p.p. 
Capital adequacy ratio growth by 1 p.p. –0.0984458 
Asset growth by 1% –0.008599275 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. –0.0022046 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.0000118 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.0162334 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.00762 
Considering quantity-based mechanism, in decision-making related to additional investment into 
deposits of private domestic banks, individuals take the same bank fundamentals into account: the 
share of consumer loans in total assets and the size of a bank. An increase of share of consumer 
loans by 1 percentage point results in additional inflow of 1.77 mln. rubles of personal deposits. 
Additional 1 percent of total assets provides an increase of personal deposit growth by 0.85 mln. 
ruble. Personal disposable income becomes significant too: each additional ruble of depositors' pri-
vate disposable income results in an increase of deposit growth by 39 thousand rubles .  
Applied to private domestic banks the price-based mechanism seems to be at work as well. This is 
expressed in the significance of capital adequacy ratio: more reliable banks with higher capital to 
total assets ratio offer lower interest rates. The corresponding effect of 1 p.p. increase of the ratio is 
0.02 p.p. In general riskier private domestic banks do offer higher interest rates to attract individual 
depositors, as it was suggested by price-based market discipline paradigm. Table 7 summarizes the 
effects provided by changes in bank fundamentals and macrofactors.  
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Table 7. Disciplining by quantity and by price: private national banks 
  Additional deposit growth, thousand rubles* 
Asset growth by 1% 854.3452579 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 1768.573 
Income growth by 1 ruble 39.06071 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 43522.31 
  Change in interest rate, p.p. 
Capital adequacy ratio growth by 1 p.p. –0.0203618 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 0.0286326 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. –0.6892 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.00219 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 3.66925 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 1.97472 
* — roa is excluded (F-test (coef. for all variables equal to zero, excluding lna, cln, income, ee): p-value = 0.2570). 
Depositor discipline and deposit insurance 
At this stage we need to find out how the mechanisms of market discipline were influenced by ad-
mittance of banks from different groups into the deposit insurance system. The results of Specifica-
tion 2 estimation are represented in Tables 23–24 in Appendix A1.  
Considering all groups of banks quantity-based disciplinary mechanism, which is represented by 
depositors' sensibility to the bank's size, does not disappear with the deposit insurance system intro-
duction (see Table 8). Moreover the corresponding effect is increased from 2.4 mln. rubles of addi-
tional deposit growth to 3.4 mln. ruble. Interestingly to note, the fact itself that the bank entered the 
system significantly reduces the deposit growth. We can observe additional outflow of 1363 mln. 
rubles of individuals' funds solely due to the fact that the bank began to use the mark "All deposits 
are insured". 
Estimating Specification 2 regression for all banks allows us to reveal the signs of disciplining by 
price, which seems to be blurred after Specification 1 regression estimation. After the deposit insur-
ance system introduction the depositors require higher interest rates if they own the deposits in 
banks with lower capital adequacy ratio (additional 0.023 p.p. for each 1 p.p. reduction of the ratio).  
For the state banks disciplining by quantity is represented by the choice of larger bank in term of 
assets, as it was demonstrated on the previous stage. Moreover the effect of 1% increase of total as-
sets is close to that obtained earlier (nearly 39 mln. rubles of additional deposit growth), and does 
not change as the banks entered the deposit insurance system (see Table 9).  
Price-based mechanism of market discipline is still absent: deposit interest rates demonstrate no 
sensitivity to bank fundamentals related to risk-taking. The deposit insurance system introduction 
did not improve the state of affairs, although changed the sensitivity to macroeconomic factors. 
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Table 8. Disciplining by quantity and by price: all banks 
  Additional deposit 
growth, before DIS 
Additional deposit 
growth, after DIS 
Asset growth by 1% 2436.96538 3397.042157 
Admittance to DIS – –1363816 
  Change in interest rate, 
before DIS, p.p. 
Change in interest rate, 
after DIS, p.p. 
Asset growth by 1% – 0.002714251 
Capital adequacy growth by 1 p.p. – –0.0230752 
Growth of the bad loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.0658961 –0.0658961 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.0337825 0.0006423 
Growth of the net interbank loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.0205127 –0.000113 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. – 0.0255915 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.0023 0.00422 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. – –0.8549 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 4.44846 5.59273 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 1.25345 5.15975 
Table 9. Disciplining by quantity and by price: state banks 
  Additional deposit growth, 
before DIS 
Additional deposit growth, 
after DIS 
Asset growth by 1% 38900.93787 38900.93787 
  Change in interest rate, 
before DIS, p.p. 
Change in interest rate, 
after DIS, p.p. 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. –3.98628 –0.58963 
Income growth by 1 ruble –0.0047 0.00455 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 11.04285 4.95447 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble – 5.40825 
The depositors of foreign banks surprisingly exercise disciplining by quantity: we saw no discipline 
on the previous stage. Before the deposit insurance system introduction the deposit growth is ex-
tremely sensitive to net non-interest expenses, but after it the effect of 1 p.p. increase in the corre-
sponding ratio, was reduced nearly fourfold (see Table 10).  
Table 10. Disciplining by quantity: foreign banks 
  Additional deposit growth, 
before DIS 
Additional deposit growth, 
after DIS 
Growth of the net non-interest expenses to total 
assets ratio by 1 p.p. 25404.41 6485.46 
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At last proper attention should by paid to private domestic banks (see Table 11). Before their admit-
tance to the deposit insurance system there are no signs of the quantity-based disciplinary mecha-
nism. But the sensitivity to the bank size — which we obtained on the previous stage — proved to 
be significant after the deposit insurance system introduction. Although the corresponding effect if 
much lower: only 0.44mln.rubles of additional deposit growth is provided by 1% increase of total 
assets.15 
Table 11. Disciplining by quantity and by price: private national banks 
  Additional deposit 
growth, before DIS 
Additional deposit 
growth, after DIS 
Growth of return on assets ratio by 1 p.p. – –11323.71 
Asset growth by 1% – 440.1703979 
  Change in interest rate, 
before DIS, p.p. 
Change in interest rate, 
after DIS, p.p. 
Asset growth by 1% – 0.003219529 
Capital adequacy growth by 1 p.p. – –0.021635 
Growth of the bad loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.0695161 –0.0695161 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.0378562 0.0040367 
Growth of the net interbank loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.02208 0.0009721 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. – 0.0280036 
Inflation growth by 1 percentage point – –0.87307 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.00233 0.00428 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 4.51528 5.68414 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 1.27966 5.26481 
Admittance to DIS – –190.2756 
As for private domestic banks price-based mechanism seems to work in the direction "opposite" to 
that we expected it to work in: higher interest rates are offered by the banks characterized by higher 
proportions of consumer loans and net interbank loans in total assets as well as by lower share of 
written-off loans in total assets. The first observation may be interpreted as a sign of an actively ex-
ploited retail strategy, namely consumer loan direction development (and to grant more loans some 
additional funs may be required), but to find an interpretation of the second and the third ones is a 
tricky task, if we consider only supply-side point of view.16 
                                                 
15 One may try to explain the negative effect of ROA increase from "higher return — higher risk" point of view. How-
ever as we do not separate ROA on interest and non-interest part, our primary hypothesis is that higher ROA is associ-
ated with higher efficiency of the bank, not with higher risk-taking.  
16 We do not try to explain this or that effect by viewing the situation as a bank does, i.e. do not mix the supply side (the 
depositors) and the demand side (the banks). 
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After the deposit insurance system introduction, higher interest rates are offered by banks, charac-
terized by higher proportions of consumer and net interbank loans in total assets, so the effects 
changed to the opposite, more correspondent to market discipline paradigm (but are very low, less 
than 0.01 p.p.). One more significant bank fundamental capital to total assets ratio: an increase of 
this ratio by 1 p.p. results into a reduction of average interest rate by 0.02 p.p. percentage points. 
That's worth noting that on the previous stage we obtained the same effect of capital to total assets 
ratio 1 p.p. increase.  
5.2. Maturity shifts 
Descriptive statistics 
The market shares of this or that group of banks are not the same on the market for different deposit 
categories. The market for on-call deposits (see Fig. 4a) witnesses two virtually equal groups of 
players: state banks and private domestic banks. The first one was gradually loosing the positions 
from the second half of 2005, the second one was gaining market share until 2006, but was stopped 
by actively expanding foreign banks.  
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Fig. 4a. Market shares: on-call deposits 
From the end of 2005 foreign banks increase significantly their presence on both markets of time 
deposits (see Figs 4b, 4c). But if on the market for short-time deposits they reduce the shares of 
both state and private domestic banks, the market for long-term deposits witnesses the strengthening 
positions of the latter: a piece of a pie lost by state banks is shared by other two groups of players.  
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Fig. 4b. Market shares: short-term deposits 
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Fig. 4c. Market shares: long-term deposits 
Fig. 5 demonstrates how the share of this or that category of deposits was changing during the 
whole studied period of time.  
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Fig. 5. Deposit maturity structure over time 
It is easy to note that the majority of personal deposits are the time deposit with maturity exceeding 
half a year: by the second quarter of 2006 the share increased to 86.5% (from 73.5% in the begin-
ning of the period). In the same time the share of time deposits with maturity less than half a year 
fell from 12.5% in the beginning to 7.7% in the end of the period, and the share of on-call deposits 
decreased even more dramatically — from 14% to 5.8%. Thus it may be stated that the period of 
banks' admittance to the deposit insurance system, as well as two quarters after the mass admittance 
was ended, witnessed a shift in depositors' "preferences" in favor of more long-term deposits.  
Table 25 in Appendix A1 contains the summary statistics, which may serve as an additional proof 
of this statement: all the deposits with the maturity longer than half a year are in average character-
ized by deposit growth and the state of affairs does not change over time. In the same time we can 
observe the outflow of funds from short-term and — for majority of quarters — on-call deposits, 
but the outflow is much less intense (in average the change in long-term deposits is 9–10 times the 
change in deposits of other categories).  
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The most important question at this stage is how this shift corresponds with market discipline. Is the 
depositors' choice a result of intertemporal preferences of liquidity (and, consequently, by differ-
ences of interest rates) or the depositors distinguish between risky and reliable banks exploiting the 
maturity shifts mechanism?17 All these questions should be answered and the influence of deposit 
insurance system introduction on these answers is to be examined as well. 
Market discipline and maturity shifts 
Tables 26 and 28 in Appendix A1 contain the results of model estimation according to Specifica-
tions 3 and 3a respectively. Regressions for Specification 4 model proved to be insignificant either 
with or without taking the deposit insurance system into consideration (see Tables 27 and 29 in Ap-
pendix A1). So we focus on examining the quantitative maturity shifts and start from the general 
analysis of this mechanism. Table 12 contains the effects, which prove that there are clear signs of 
maturity shifts at work for all banks. First of all additional long-term deposit growth generated by 
an increase of total assets seem to be some degree18 provided by the corresponding reduction of on-
call and short-term deposit growth. The shifts are even more pronounced if we consider only time 
deposits: higher share of consumer loans as well as higher capital adequacy ratio results into nega-
tive additional grow of short-term deposits and positive one of long-term deposits.  
Although when we turn to groups of banks it becomes clear that the results obtained for all banks, 
seem to be true only for the group of state banks. The depositors of these banks discipline them by 
switching from short-term to long-term deposits if the bank is characterized by higher capital ade-
quacy ratio, total assets and the consumer loans to total assets ratio.  
Table 13 demonstrates the influence of deposit insurance system introduction on the maturity shift 
effects. Definitely there is no influence taking all the banks together. Before and after banks' admit-
tance to the system the results are the same as obtained on the previous stage: an increase in assets 
provides additional long-term deposit growth and reduces the growth of on-call and short-term de-
posits. The same is true for an increase of consumer loans to total assets ratio with the only differ-
ence that on-call deposits are not involved.  
What the deposit insurance changed is the maturity shift effects for state banks, in particular — for 
short-term deposits. The effect of 1% increase of total assets before the system introduction is virtu-
ally 4.5 times the same effect after it (the reductions of deposit growth are 15.3 mln. rubles and 3.45 
mln. rubles respectively). A 1 p.p. growth of the share of consumer loans in total assets has much 
less pronounced influence after the deposit insurance system introduction as well (48.3 mln. rubles 
and 27.3 mln. ruble). 
                                                 
17 One may argue that average interest rate is a function of deposit maturity distribution and thus it is quite incorrect to 
analyze price-based market discipline and maturity shifts as separate mechanisms. Table 33 in Appendix III demon-
strates that this hypothesis is not proved on this particular data set. 
18 The maximum degree is 10.5%, if we suppose that all the ex-short-term deposits are converted into long-term 
deposits. 
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Table 12. Maturity shifts 
Group of banks Category  of deposits  
Additional deposit growth, 
thousand rubles* 
On-call deposits Asset growth by 1% –709.5348094 
Capital adequacy ratio growth by 1 p.p. –1104.246 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p.  
–1361.61 
Growth of the net interbank loans to total 
assets ratio by 1 p.p. 
–1147.258 
Short-term 
deposits 
Asset growth by 1% –389.2851024 
Capital adequacy ratio growth by 1 p.p. 16675.4 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p.  
21742.07 
Growth of the net interbank loans to total 
assets ratio by 1 p.p. 
10434.61 
All banks 
Long-term 
deposits* 
Asset growth by 1% 6319.956622 
Growth of the bad loans to total assets ratio 
by 1 p.p. 
–992000 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p.  
–44484 
Short-term 
deposits 
Asset growth by 1% –5304.957202 
Growth of the bad loans to total assets ratio 
by 1 p.p.  
11500000 
Growth of the net interbank loans to total 
assets ratio by 1 p.p. 
567000 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p.  
641000 
State banks 
Long-term 
deposits 
Asset growth by 1% 67216.25607 
* — la and niexp are excluded (F-test (coef. for all variables equal to zero, excluding ca, nibc, lna and cln): p-value = 0.3433) 
The last but still very important moment to note here is the mechanism of maturity shifts function-
ing for private domestic banks, namely for on-call and long-term deposits.19 Before the deposit in-
surance system introduction a 1% increase of total deposits resulted into 0.07 mln. rubles reduction 
of on-call deposit growth and 0.76 mln. rubles of additional long-term deposit growth. After the de-
posit insurance system introduction the mechanism did not disappear, moreover it works even more 
intensively: the effects are now 0.09 mln. rubles and 1.3 mln. rubles respectively.  
The depositors of foreign banks did not use the mechanism of maturity shifts to discipline them be-
fore the deposit insurance appeared, so it is not surprising they did not start to do so when it was 
introduced.  
                                                 
19 The absence of disciplining using short-term deposits may be explained by two-sided deposit flow: from on-call to 
short-term deposits and from short-term to long-term ones, so one should not state that this category does not "take 
part" in maturity shifts. 
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Table 13. Maturity shifts, the influence of DIS 
Additional deposit growth, 
thousand rubles  Group of banks Category  of deposits  
Before DIS After DIS 
On-call deposits Asset growth by 1% –709.535 –709.535 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p.  
–1043.23 –1043.23 Short-term 
deposits 
Asset growth by 1% –347.714 –347.714 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p.  
17562.92 17562.92 
All banks 
Long-term 
deposits 
Asset growth by 1% 5752.543 5752.543 
Growth of the bad loans to total assets ratio 
by 1 p.p.  
–5670000 –50000 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p.  
–48341.8 –27346.5 
Growth of the net interbank loans to total 
assets ratio by 1 p.p. 
–92988.5 –1447.54 
Growth of the net non-interest expenses to 
total assets ratio by 1% 
477000 11000 
Short-term 
deposits 
Asset growth by 1% –15298.7 –3450.42 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p.  
560000 560000 
State banks 
Long-term 
deposits* 
Asset growth by 1% 60469.84 60469.84 
On-call deposits Asset growth by 1% –71.6196 –93.4748 
Growth of return on assets ratio by 1 p.p. – –10554.5 
Asset growth by 1% 758.8083 1276.786 
Private domestic 
banks Long-term 
deposits 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble – –663786.9 
* — nibc and niexp are excluded (F-test coef. for all variables equal to zero, excluding lna and cln: p-value = 0.1010). 
5.3. Is market discipline the same for all private domestic banks? 
In our analysis we treated private domestic banks as a sole group, but there may be significant dif-
ferences within this group. The most natural subdivision that may be taken into account is small and 
big banks in terms of assets. The important question that arises here is whether the influence of de-
posit insurance system introduction on market discipline is different for these subgroups of private 
domestic banks. 
There are numerous ways to break all private domestic banks into big and small ones. Here we use 
two possible approaches. The idea of the first one is to locate separately the smallest — even tiny 
— banks. A good criterion is the level of 5 mln. euro for bank capital. From the beginning of 2007 
there is a special treatment for these banks in Russia: they are not allowed to reduce the capital. The 
second approach lies in the idea that 20% of the private domestic banks hold more than 80% of total 
assets of this group of banks, so the next division principle is to locate separately 80% of the small-
est private domestic banks.  
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Market discipline: 5 mln. euro as a benchmark 
Table 14 demonstrates how the group is divided into "big" and "small" banks according to these to 
the first approach:  
Table 14. Number of "big" and "small" private domestic banks 
Period Capital over 5 mln. euro Capital less than 5 mln. euro 
3q. 2004 206 195 
4q. 2004 206 192 
1q. 2005 214 201 
2q. 2005 232 217 
3q. 2005 239 211 
4q. 2005 242 205 
1q. 2006 246 203 
2q. 2006 267 211 
First of all the depositors of the smallest banks — with the capital under 5mln.euro — discipline 
their banks by quantity choosing larger bank in terms of assets (see Table 15).20 The scope of bank's 
operations on the consumer loan market is also taken into account. Both bank fundamentals were 
significant before the deposit insurance system introduction and do not loose their influence after it.  
Disciplining by price appears after the banks' admittance to the deposit insurance system and is ex-
pressed in requiring additional 0.044 p.p. of interest rate for each 1 p.p. reduction of capital ade-
quacy ratio. 
Table 15. Disciplining by quantity and by price: "small" banks (1st approach) 
 Additional deposit growth, before DIS* 
Additional deposit 
growth, after DIS* 
Asset growth by 1% 103.2654291 103.2654291 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 67689.57 67689.57 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. – –18707.74 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. 3125.947 3125.947 
Income growth by 1 ruble 5.074177 5.074177 
 Change in interest rate, before DIS, p.p. 
Change in interest rate, 
after DIS, p.p. 
Capital adequacy growth by 1 p.p. – –0.044246 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 0.0712148 0.0712148 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 0.0284015 0.0284015 
Asset growth by 1% 0.000185589 0.000185589 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. 0 –0.0109826 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.0000251 0.0000461 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.0518991 0.0666026 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.0131708 0.064613 
Admittance to DIS – –2.34673 
* — niexp is excluded (F-test coef. for all variables equal to zero, excluding lna, la, infl, income and cln: p-value = 0.0651). 
                                                 
20 The corresponding full regression estimation results are presented in Table 32 in Appendix A1. 
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The state of affairs is slightly different for "big" banks (see Table 16). First of all the depositors dis-
cipline them by quantity choosing a bank with higher total assets. The deposit insurance system in-
troduction added power to this mechanism: the additional deposit growth provided by 1% increase 
of total assets rose from 1.4 mln. rubles to 2 mln. ruble. It is worth noting that the system itself re-
duced the deposit growth by 3596 mln. ruble. The disciplining by price as for "small" banks appears 
after the deposit insurance system introduction. The depositors require additional 0.02 p.p. of de-
posit interest rate — less, than those of "small banks" — for each 1 p.p. reduction of capital ade-
quacy ratio. The sensitivity to asset growth is also observed but is close to zero.  
Table 16. Disciplining by quantity and by price: "big" banks (1st approach) 
 Additional deposit growth, before DIS 
Additional deposit growth, 
after DIS 
Asset growth by 1% 1378.182515 2070.391012 
Growth of return on assets ratio by 1 p.p. – –2548753 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble – 93863.88 
Admittance to DIS – –3596654 
  Change in interest rate, before DIS, p.p.* 
Change in interest rate, 
after DIS, p.p.* 
Capital adequacy growth by 1 p.p. – –0.0234828 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. – 0.0423653 
Asset growth by 1% –0.0000848 –0.0000848 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. – –0.0067874 
Income growth by 1 ruble – 0.000012 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.043284 0.043284 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.0122792 0.0340967 
Admittance to DIS – –0.8381432 
* — niexp, bln and roa are excluded (F-test (dis*niexp = dis*bln = roa = las = 0): p-value = 0.5894). 
Considering maturity shifts we found no evidence the depositors switch from on-call and short-term 
deposits to long-term deposits (see Table 33 in Appendix A1).  
Market discipline: 20% of banks — 85% of assets 
Table 17 demonstrates how the group is divided into "big" and "small" banks according to these to 
the second approach.  
The possibility to use the label "All deposits are insured" increased the deposit growth by 28.2 mln. 
rubles for the group of "small" private domestic banks determined according to the 2nd approach 
(see Table 18).21 In the same time the sensitivity of the depositors to the share of consumer loans in 
                                                 
21 The corresponding full regression estimation results are presented in Table 34 in Appendix A1. 
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total assets fell from 1.3 mln. rubles to 0.451 mln. rubles of additional deposit growth provided by 1 
p.p. increase of the ratio. Price-based mechanism is also changed by deposit insurance. Before the 
system introduction higher interest rates were offered by banks with lower capital adequacy ratios. 
As it was introduced the sensitivity to this ratio increased nearly twofold and a number of other 
bank fundamentals became significant, namely the shares of bad and net interbank loans. 
Table 17. Number of "big" and "small" private domestic banks (share of assets in total assets of private domestic banks) 
Period First 20% of banks The rest 80% of banks 
3q. 2004 81 (85.40%) 320 (14.6%) 
4q. 2004 82 (85.14%) 316 (14.86%) 
1q. 2005 83 (85.13%) 332 (14.87%) 
2q. 2005 90 (84.96%) 359 (15.04%) 
3q. 2005 91 (84.07%) 359 (15.93%) 
4q. 2005 89 (84.35%) 358 (15.65%) 
1q. 2006 89 (84.23%) 360 (15.77%) 
2q. 2006 96 (84.48%) 382 (15.52%) 
Table 18. Disciplining by quantity and by price: "small" banks (2nd approach) 
 Additional deposit growth, before DIS 
Additional deposit 
growth, after DIS 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 1311.043 450.8785 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. – –591.9175 
Admittance to DIS – 28156 
  Change in interest rate, before DIS, p.p. 
Change in interest rate, 
after DIS, p.p. 
Capital adequacy growth by 1 p.p. –0.0296906 –0.0515611 
Growth of the bad loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. – 0.0638627 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 0.0474941 0.072568 
Growth of the net interbank loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.0207635 0.0060631 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. 0.0187299 0.0387639 
Asset growth by 1% 0.00017057 0.000206141 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. – –0.0107341 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.000023 0.0000482 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.0503495 0.0677307 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.0145567 0.0668359 
Admittance to DIS – –2.539064 
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The mechanism of maturity shift is used after "small" banks' admittance to the deposit insurance 
system, although not very actively (see Table 19).22 A 1% increase of total assets results into 0.17 
mln. rubles of additional long-term deposit growth reducing that of on-call deposits by 0.04 mln. 
ruble. In the same way an increase of the share of liquid assets in total assets leads to a reduction of 
on-call deposit growth by 0.16 mln. rubles accompanied by the corresponding 0.46 mln. rubles of 
additional long-term deposit growth. Interestingly, the deposit insurance itself cut significantly the 
growth of short-term deposits (by 89.8 mln. ruble) providing additional on-call (by 49.5 mln. ruble) 
and long-term (by 17.9 mln. ruble) deposit growth. 
Table 19. Disciplining by maturity shifts: "small" banks (2nd approach)  
  Additional deposit growth, before DIS 
Additional deposit 
growth, after DIS 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p. 
– –164.473 
Asset growth by 1% – –37.4444 
On-call deposits 
Admittance to DIS – 49484.24 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble – 3199.091 Short-term 
deposits Admittance to DIS – –89786.68 
Growth of the consumer loans to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p. 
587.2709 587.2709 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets 
ratio by 1 p.p. 
– –456.731 
Asset growth by 1% – 166.2135 
Long-term 
deposits 
Admittance to DIS – 17917.49 
Considering "big" banks disciplining by quantity was not affected by deposit insurance system in-
troduction: the depositors still choose larger banks (see Table 20). Price-based mechanism, previ-
ously expressed only in sensibility to the share of liquid assets, ROA and bank size, is virtually un-
changed too with the only exception: the net non-interest expenses to total assets ratio was added 
into the list of significant variables. At last the mechanism of maturity shifts is not used by the de-
positors of these banks.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Now it seems to be important to accumulate all the results obtained at the previous stages and make 
some general conclusion on all three mechanisms of market discipline — quantity-based, price-
based and maturity shifts — functioning on the market for personal deposits and the effect of de-
posit insurance system introduction.  
                                                 
22 The corresponding full regression estimation results are presented in Table 35 in Appendix A1. 
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Table 20. Disciplining by quantity and by price: "big" banks (2nd approach) 
 Additional deposit growth, before DIS 
Additional deposit growth, 
after DIS 
Asset growth by 1% 3511.890667 3511.890667 
 Change in interest rate, before DIS, p.p. 
Change in interest rate, 
after DIS, p.p. 
Capital adequacy growth by 1 p.p. – 0.0398466 
Growth of the bad loans to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.0346526 –0.0346526 
Growth of the liquid assets to total assets ratio by 1 p.p. –0.0375423 –0.0375423 
Growth of return on assets ratio by 1 p.p. – –0.0245774 
Growth of the net non-interest expenses to total assets 
ratio by 1% – –0.0245774 
Asset growth by 1% –0.0000872 –0.0000872 
Inflation growth by 1 p.p. – –0.00527 
Income growth by 1 ruble 0.0000199 0.0000315 
EUR/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.0110273 0.0311577 
USD/RUB exchange rate growth by 1 ruble 0.0386997 0.0386997 
Admittance to DIS – –0.7886616 
The period of time from the third quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2006 witnessed two im-
portant tendencies in individual depositor investing behavior. First of all since deposit insurance 
system was introduced foreign and private domestic banks are gaining additional market share and 
state banks' share — even Sberbank's one — is gradually decreasing. Moreover, foreign banks 
prove to become active players on the markets of deposits of all maturities, while private domestic 
banks are gaining market share mostly on the long-term deposit market. There is a widespread opin-
ion — and our data analysis provide some evidence on it — that state banks are more reliable (and 
not only due to implicit state guaranties but thanks to bank fundamentals demonstrating lower de-
gree of risk-taking) at least compared to the private domestic banks, but private domestic bank offer 
higher interest rates than both state and domestic ones. So the suspicion immediately arises: provid-
ing explicit guaranties, the deposit insurance system introduction stimulated individual depositors to 
choose of riskier banks. However the opportunities of moral hazard in this or that group of banks 
may be reduced, if market discipline is strong. 
What we find is the fact that market discipline — as it was expected — is different for different 
groups of banks. The absence of both price-based and quantity based mechanisms was proved for 
foreign banks. The depositors did not use them either before or after deposit insurance system intro-
duction. 
For state banks the quantity-based mechanism proved to function at least in terms of bank size. The 
depositors are sensitive to bank total assets and this sensitivity was not removed by the deposit in-
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surance system introduction, that is in fact a change from implicit to explicit state guaranties. The 
size of the bank is however the only bank fundamental, which the state bank depositors seem to be 
interested in.  
The quantity-based mechanism seems to be used in the same way by depositors of private domestic 
banks: their choice is determined by bank's size and no other bank fundamentals. The deposit insur-
ance system introduction however kept this mechanism in power. The price-based mechanism is 
more explicit especially after deposit insurance system introduction: higher interest rates were of-
fered by banks characterized by lower capital adequacy ratio — the only ratio all the banks are 
obliged to publish — and higher net interbank loans to total assets ratio. Although both effects are 
not very large (a drop in capital adequacy ratio by 1 percentage point makes a bank to increase av-
erage interest rate by only 0.02 percentage points), they are significant and that is important. Testing 
the hypotheses for different groups of private domestic banks does not change these conclusions 
much: small as well as big banks are disciplined by quantity (even more intensively after the deposit 
insurance system introduction — for those banks with the capital exceeding 5 mln. euro) and by 
price (more intensively after the deposit insurance system introduction —for small banks).  
So what we obtain finally is the intensive growth of total market share of the banks, which are not 
disciplined by individual depositors at all (foreign banks), but there are some good news — another 
group of banks actively gaining the share of the market — private domestic banks — is at least to 
some degree disciplined by depositors using quantity— and price-based mechanisms. 
The second important tendency in individual depositor behavior is related to gradual growth of the 
share of long-term time deposits in the structure of total deposits. The proportion of the deposits 
with maturity longer than half a year is rising, the share of on-call deposits has already became less 
than twice as low as two years ago, the share of short-term deposits is less vulnerable but is gradu-
ally decreasing too. The possible explanation is the following: as the depositors received explicit 
state guaranties they decided to invest for a longer period of time to yield more. This tendency — 
although beneficial for the banks — is of course related to additional risk-taking by depositors (the 
interest payments that will be lost are higher for long-term deposits). The probability of bearing 
losses is reduced, however, if the depositors refuse investing into long-term deposits in riskier banks 
preferring more reliable ones for long-term investment, or put in other words exert some sort of 
market discipline we call maturity shifts. 
Again the intensity of market discipline use is different for different groups of banks. Considering 
foreign banks there are no signs of maturity shifts mechanism used by depositors before as well as 
after deposit insurance system introduction.  
For state banks maturity shifts are at work for time deposits: depositors switch from long-term de-
posits to short-term ones if a bank is smaller (in terms of assets) and is characterized by lower pro-
portion of consumer loans. The deposit insurance system introduction however reduced the inten-
sity of maturity shifts significantly. 
The private domestic banks witness maturity shifts mechanism functioning for on-call and long-
term deposits (it may be blurred for short-term deposits due to two-way flows, as it was noted ear-
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lier). The depositors prefer to switch to long-term deposits if they are their bank is characterized by 
higher total assets and — for 80% of smallest banks — higher share of liquid assets. The deposit 
insurance system introduction did not remove this type of market discipline, moreover it increased 
the corresponding effects of bank fundamentals' changes. 
Figs 6a–6c, demonstrating the changes in structure of deposits in different groups of banks over the 
whole studied period help to make final conclusions. 
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Fig. 6a. Maturity structure change over time, state banks 
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Fig. 6b. Maturity structure change over time, foreign banks 
So the absence of effective price-based, quantity-based or maturity shifts mechanisms either ini-
tially absent or removed by the deposit insurance system introduction should not be very disap-
pointing for those who think about the perspectives of the personal deposit market. The foreign 
banks, which are not discipline by their depositors, accumulated mostly on-call and short-term de-
posits. Thus the absence of market discipline by price and by quantity may be explained by the fact 
that depositors have no need to monitor the banks where they do not have long-term investments. 
The significant changes that took place in 2006 may raise some worries, as the perspectives for 
moral hazard problem are not corrected by market discipline existence, but the total share of foreign 
banks on the long-term deposit market does not exceed 4%.  
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Fig. 6c. Maturity structure change over time, private domestic banks 
Most of the long-term deposits are accumulated in state banks characterized by effective quantity-
based discipline mechanism and implicit state guaranties for the total amount of deposit. And at last 
the deposit insurance introduction did not stop the use of quantity-based discipline mechanism ap-
plied to private domestic banks, in the same time the depositors began to use price-based mecha-
nism even more intensively (although one may say — not sufficiently effective however as the ef-
fects of bank fundamentals' changes are still rather slow), for all the deposits as well as the mecha-
nism of maturity shifts: distribute additional deposits according to level of bank risk by choosing 
more reliable banks for long-term deposits and more risky banks for on-call ones. So the deposit 
insurance system did not remove the mechanisms, which may prevent — at least to some degree — 
the moral hazard usually associated with deposit insurance, and in the same time provided some sort 
of competitive advantage to the group of banks that had enjoyed no implicit guaranties earlier.  
The last observation that is important to stress is the following: in general the individual deposi-
tors demonstrate sensitivity to the information available for them without any particular search of 
financial statements: bank size, capital adequacy ratio, activity on the consumer loan market. The 
introduction of public reporting of information about bank's risks — the measure offered by Basel 
II — may be an appropriate way to increase the effectiveness of market discipline by individual 
depositors.  
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APPENDICES  
A1. Tables 
Table 21. Descriptive statistics: all deposits 
Panel A. All banks 
  Variable 
Obs Mean. Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 417 3777754 5.40e+07 88 1.10e+09 
ddep 417 79367.99 1871181 –5828437 3.64e+07 
ir 417 .0644629 .0457733 .0001019 .6747258 
ca 417 .2638748 .1462779 .0521134 .8917158 
bln 417 .0126617 .0419882 0 .5521721 
cln 417 .0907409 .1167518 .000108 .6893716 
nibc 417 –.0184558 .1000011 –.620933 .4716712 
niexp 417 .03961 .2307843 –.2040651 4.457994 
roa 417 .0157415 .0155122 –.0178486 .160392 
la 417 .2150645 .1436044 .0164097 .9984988 
3q
. 2
00
4 
lna 417 13.72976 1.847726 8.155649 21.06518 
dep 414 4051673 5.66e+07 592 1.15e+09 
ddep 414 325571.4 3047896 –1092509 6.09e+07 
ir 414 .0796071 .0396034 .0001034 .6220725 
ca 414 .2357941 .1353014 .0076326 .8490604 
bln 414 .0126775 .0442089 0 .5107955 
cln 414 .0987934 .1252185 .0001002 .7134277 
nibc 414 –.0125603 .0958117 –.6705407 .6167986 
niexp 414 .0514202 .3295347 –.2708086 6.413497 
roa 414 .0242725 .0217247 –.1549579 .1694834 
la 414 .2134085 .1492907 .0048782 1.006089 
4q
. 2
00
4 
lna 414 13.87524 1.812784 8.03301 21.13237 
dep 435 4225220 5.82e+07 120 1.21e+09 
ddep 435 291434.7 2656107 –1232967 5.36e+07 
ir 435 .0201094 .0090273 0 .093687 
ca 435 .2368326 .1443167 .0131826 .9416423 
bln 435 .0118308 .0385854 0 .4131097 
cln 435 .1015383 .130124 0 .7088966 
nibc 435 –.0141594 .1098172 –.7286949 .4462167 
niexp 435 .0660316 .3004864 –.3599024 5.541764 
roa 435 .0289547 .0232727 –.1125933 .1699864 
la 435 .2334724 .1547853 .0029436 1.30724 
1q
. 2
00
5 
lna 435 13.92858 1.835873 8.109826 21.22197 
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Panel A. All banks 
  Variable 
Obs Mean. Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 467 4144968 5.94e+07 138 1.28e+09 
ddep 467 257309.8 3626051 –8010211 7.64e+07 
ir 467 .0403098 .0168471 0 .1519327 
ca 467 .221473 .1374687 .0144276 .9052234 
bln 467 .0112416 .0351973 0 .4020711 
cln 467 .1048936 .1287577 .0000491 .7727023 
nibc 467 –.0115853 .1104373 –.6381338 .7323637 
niexp 467 .0171381 .0519443 –.0334381 .7376384 
roa 467 .0073696 .0094086 –.0189565 .1256776 
la 467 .2308618 .1445309 .0219529 1.233397 
2q
. 2
00
5 
lna 467 13.89192 1.822509 8.304248 21.27992 
dep 468 4230099 6.03e+07 15 1.30e+09 
ddep 468 105681.2 1433188 –1.90e+07 2.19e+07 
ir 468 .0615533 .0398458 0 .5258216 
ca 468 .2211224 .1357156 .0352837 .8923106 
bln 468 .0114981 .0360128 0 .3792491 
cln 468 .1074106 .1262224 .0000843 .7319489 
nibc 468 –.0138076 .1255817 –.7263687 .8229215 
niexp 468 .0295298 .0939277 –.0871598 1.303705 
roa 468 .0142644 .0150067 –.0478444 .141252 
la 468 .214558 .1481127 .0110567 .9498737 
3q
. 2
00
5 
lna 468 13.9118 1.775756 8.369621 21.35457 
dep 465 4519426 6.28e+07 8 1.35e+09 
ddep 465 377995.8 4958812 –1575550 1.06e+08 
ir 465 .0802231 .0524477 0 .6369784 
ca 465 .2178391 .1429794 .0019714 .9895038 
bln 465 .0114072 .0362646 0 .4026283 
cln 465 .1126508 .1277689 .0000533 .7334004 
nibc 465 –.0165489 .1294795 –.883733 .8910223 
niexp 465 .046784 .1486861 –.1194271 2.058431 
roa 465 .0219853 .025029 –.1767864 .2614457 
la 465 .2082864 .1583682 .0129681 1.448546 
4q
. 2
00
5 
lna 465 13.99278 1.792776 8.337349 21.44289 
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Panel A. All banks 
  Variable 
Obs Mean. Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 467 4795239 6.69e+07 1 1.44e+09 
ddep 467 217157.2 3582116 –6474526 7.65e+07 
ir 467 .0215667 .0087876 0 .0862796 
ca 467 .207616 .1320551 .0373898 .8672795 
bln 467 .0110945 .0371869 0 .3966099 
cln 467 .1185657 .1307378 .0000243 .7782077 
nibc 467 –.0120584 .1223758 –.886369 .8126496 
niexp 467 .0684302 .235865 –.3309897 3.613013 
roa 467 .0283225 .039241 –.2175769 .5166391 
la 467 .2175329 .1519405 .0173475 .9700304 
1q
. 2
00
6 
lna 467 14.08171 1.776756 9.537303 21.50941 
dep 506 4842893 6.82e+07 1 1.53e+09 
ddep 506 284043.4 4468793 –4399652 9.97e+07 
ir 506 .043016 .0199505 0 .3001061 
ca 506 .2019839 .137991 .0355217 .8123338 
bln 506 .0086196 .0263714 0 .3323056 
cln 506 .1185098 .129792 1.45e–06 .8651733 
nibc 506 –.0060108 .117808 –.6876813 .8239527 
niexp 506 .0172542 .0843608 –.0542265 1.528013 
roa 506 .0081225 .0221008 –.0179305 .346819 
la 506 .2028444 .1440184 .0193348 .8492058 
2q
. 2
00
6 
lna 506 14.20688 1.804011 8.381145 21.5909 
 
Panel B. State banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 8 1.48e+08 3.85e+08 24600.5 1.10e+09 
ddep 8 5290409 1.30e+07 –2596891 3.64e+07 
ir 8 .0572048 .0145533 .031866 .0748359 
ca 8 .2003384 .0859893 .1287302 .3929095 
bln 8 .0036672 .0035778 .0002339 .0084883 
cln 8 .1274314 .1585239 .0041302 .405106 
nibc 8 –.0366633 .0604207 –.1523036 .0462523 
niexp 8 .0392288 .0762088 –.0357812 .1489018 
roa 8 .0102619 .0073829 .000999 .0197605 
la 8 .1660373 .0953999 .0411092 .2863754 
3q
. 2
00
4 
lna 8 15.66306 3.444788 12.18303 21.06518 
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Panel B. State banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 8 1.56e+08 4.02e+08 24231 1.15e+09 
ddep 8 8769843 2.12e+07 820 6.09e+07 
ir 8 .0672988 .0250148 .0323308 .1045355 
ca 8 .165148 .0307499 .1222565 .2199193 
bln 8 .0044419 .0045787 .0002622 .0124663 
cln 8 .1313104 .1684779 .0057253 .4400013 
nibc 8 –.0158096 .0529389 –.0900234 .0540834 
niexp 8 .0694772 .0978517 –.0404317 .1825062 
roa 8 .0226825 .012382 .0018898 .0382592 
la 8 .2081414 .1893569 .0348924 .6051708 
4q
. 2
00
4 
lna 8 15.88515 3.362485 12.38936 21.13237 
dep 10 1.32e+08 3.79e+08 28345.5 1.21e+09 
ddep 10 6494464 1.67e+07 –442 5.36e+07 
ir 10 .0183152 .0053605 .0076288 .0252995 
ca 10 .200279 .0920812 .1151707 .4146276 
bln 10 .0032836 .0040303 .0001002 .0115289 
cln 10 .1181782 .1529742 .0009935 .449085 
nibc 10 –.0285141 .08518 –.1810552 .1284797 
niexp 10 .0721558 .1228295 –.0463178 .2588068 
roa 10 .0242263 .0140688 .0027997 .0444913 
la 10 .2007902 .1970916 .0394673 .6859389 
1q
. 2
00
5 
lna 10 15.87711 3.050615 12.56285 21.22197 
dep 10 1.40e+08 4.01e+08 32727 1.28e+09 
ddep 10 9075974 2.41e+07 –8216 7.64e+07 
ir 10 .0339359 .0086352 .0226689 .0447504 
ca 10 .1768602 .0861639 .104174 .3743946 
bln 10 .0036247 .0038591 0 .0111322 
cln 10 .1175576 .1579329 .0088568 .4402867 
nibc 10 –.0261636 .0785108 –.1715361 .066239 
niexp 10 .0245762 .0409962 –.0178793 .0845863 
roa 10 .0063294 .0056309 .00076 .0201833 
la 10 .2143558 .1819535 .0453288 .6864802 
2q
. 2
00
5 
lna 10 15.46879 3.245644 12.53401 21.27992 
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Panel B. State banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 9 1.59e+08 4.29e+08 35243 1.30e+09 
ddep 9 –1006551 7090623 –1.90e+07 5794539 
ir 9 .0484998 .0126443 .0330208 .0668563 
ca 9 .1647131 .0749304 .1026682 .3426879 
bln 9 .0039341 .0037823 .0001525 .0109874 
cln 9 .1353914 .1714088 .0087509 .4404947 
nibc 9 .0106573 .0925501 –.0945274 .1940619 
niexp 9 .0511155 .0819535 –.033095 .1743923 
roa 9 .0130415 .0061128 .0017214 .0203553 
la 9 .2021612 .1947554 .031911 .7016398 
3q
. 2
00
5 
lna 9 15.76084 3.392977 12.54669 21.35457 
dep 8 1.86e+08 4.71e+08 39509.5 1.35e+09 
ddep 8 1.42e+07 3.71e+07 –556419 1.06e+08 
ir 8 .0789519 .0427555 .0452193 .178142 
ca 8 .1604949 .066749 .1001934 .2890164 
bln 8 .0050197 .0037091 .0001359 .0110774 
cln 8 .0924096 .1474295 .0045116 .4256213 
nibc 8 –.0088268 .0640378 –.1147449 .079805 
niexp 8 .1039156 .1319985 –.0453286 .3129621 
roa 8 .0185222 .0078366 .0083908 .0308033 
la 8 .1351413 .0687679 .0262535 .2508857 
4q
. 2
00
5 
lna 8 16.18028 3.44679 12.66201 21.44289 
dep 7 2.17e+08 5.40e+08 55215.5 1.44e+09 
ddep 7 1.00e+07 2.94e+07 –6474526 7.65e+07 
ir 7 .0204444 .0068524 .0139082 .0318821 
ca 7 .1786112 .0752002 .1093463 .2893791 
bln 7 .005853 .0043315 .0008484 .0127977 
cln 7 .1062384 .169051 .0106336 .4558713 
nibc 7 –.0424484 .0708907 –.1548004 .0753842 
niexp 7 .1479549 .1975119 –.0607154 .4572408 
roa 7 .0230745 .0098196 .0111597 .0370265 
la 7 .1575931 .0961864 .0335019 .2775708 
1q
. 2
00
6 
lna 7 15.76152 3.546695 12.81492 21.50941 
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Panel B. State banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 11 1.46e+08 4.59e+08 70947 1.53e+09 
ddep 11 8731377 3.02e+07 –4399652 9.97e+07 
ir 11 .042305 .014039 .0273373 .0674806 
ca 11 .1943246 .1303677 .0961301 .5521387 
bln 11 .0060743 .00909 .0000919 .0318789 
cln 11 .085501 .1311262 1.45e–06 .4355234 
nibc 11 –.0309319 .0902825 –.1801588 .1726157 
niexp 11 .0230805 .044989 –.0167074 .1226952 
roa 11 .0086642 .0051686 .0009839 .0177921 
la 11 .196234 .1688561 .0304854 .632138 
2q
. 2
00
6 
lna 11 15.42209 3.144625 12.74912 21.5909 
 
Panel C. Foreign banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 8 2418252 3673080 12288 1.04e+07 
ddep 8 195025 450573.1 –170527 1245648 
ir 8 .0301247 .0329938 .0001594 .0888183 
ca 8 .1565061 .076607 .0713676 .310246 
bln 8 .0043738 .0076796 0 .0191417 
cln 8 .1989012 .2875341 .0009183 .6879799 
nibc 8 –.1196064 .1579195 –.4195487 .0667637 
niexp 8 .1548605 .2360346 –.0041992 .6984208 
roa 8 .0255775 .0451105 –.0001396 .1363852 
la 8 .2451017 .1868818 .0670725 .6475466 
3q
. 2
00
4 
lna 8 16.05992 1.610565 13.25151 18.08964 
dep 8 2724122 3781140 12704 1.05e+07 
ddep 8 428944.3 486923 –11597 1246374 
ir 8 .0380647 .0407483 .0001825 .10414 
ca 8 .1567323 .048073 .0947164 .2543328 
bln 8 .0048528 .0078035 .0000231 .017723 
cln 8 .2138673 .308608 .0008149 .7134277 
nibc 8 –.1263278 .1576566 –.3638399 .0531961 
niexp 8 .1926953 .2948364 –.0108625 .8444132 
roa 8 .0409087 .048126 .0089707 .1550318 
la 8 .2167302 .1811031 .0971802 .6457756 
4q
. 2
00
4 
lna 8 16.10321 1.706364 13.04762 18.20834 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
46
Panel C. Foreign banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 10 4854462 7175515 13765 2.19e+07 
ddep 10 767139.2 1581470 –25706 5025713 
ir 10 .0131119 .0144625 9.64e–06 .0339621 
ca 10 .160517 .0928081 .0922422 .4037887 
bln 10 .0112434 .0214693 .0000272 .0688783 
cln 10 .1899678 .2839575 .000782 .7088966 
nibc 10 –.0971568 .1370063 –.2618234 .1382132 
niexp 10 .2511149 .3710783 –.0371281 1.149249 
roa 10 .0407721 .0242018 .014459 .0989229 
la 10 .2050548 .1655457 .075705 .6541675 
1q
. 2
00
5 
lna 10 15.99052 2.109095 12.182 18.20237 
dep 8 3546091 5039904 18959 1.22e+07 
ddep 8 99367.75 157895.5 984 471598 
ir 8 .018128 .0191682 .0001088 .0473593 
ca 8 .1490217 .0912222 .050484 .3576738 
bln 8 .0126457 .0203226 .0000299 .0596582 
cln 8 .1434485 .2592131 .0008139 .7490926 
nibc 8 –.0525028 .1748794 –.3651203 .1367979 
niexp 8 .0804566 .1141434 –.009844 .347115 
roa 8 .0033164 .0061369 –.0081361 .0120931 
la 8 .2040039 .1480458 .0758748 .4789947 
2q
. 2
00
5 
lna 8 15.96748 2.181503 12.32571 18.2485 
dep 9 3232268 4939101 21700 1.27e+07 
ddep 9 31861.78 359379.1 –627248 799319 
ir 9 .0272608 .0276553 .0001194 .075161 
ca 9 .1725412 .1121424 .0467286 .3824185 
bln 9 .010783 .0155671 .000027 .048785 
cln 9 .1279531 .2317186 .0008641 .7066196 
nibc 9 –.0502263 .1757494 –.3385018 .242434 
niexp 9 .1501738 .2166202 –.0161611 .7002013 
roa 9 .0104664 .014857 –.0205789 .032377 
la 9 .1948223 .1404509 .0537129 .4244076 
3q
. 2
00
5 
lna 9 15.89962 2.069687 12.46918 18.38674 
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Panel C. Foreign banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 10 3186210 4714894 25016 1.31e+07 
ddep 10 98173.7 160025 –20970 485802 
ir 10 .0454712 .0426213 .0001459 .1153423 
ca 10 .15727 .1040945 .0019714 .3394728 
bln 10 .0083119 .0115061 .0000247 .0368131 
cln 10 .1803467 .2661327 .0006418 .7334004 
nibc 10 .0039483 .151035 –.2179545 .2675566 
niexp 10 .212697 .3471387 –.0205738 1.159217 
roa 10 .0198262 .0150377 .0040879 .055686 
la 10 .1743406 .133811 .053385 .5185404 
4q
. 2
00
5 
lna 10 15.96539 1.971119 12.65013 18.52411 
dep 11 7566706 1.43e+07 30134.5 4.86e+07 
ddep 11 300920.7 772765.7 –464196 2263098 
ir 11 .0139698 .0121116 .0000143 .0311143 
ca 11 .1512755 .0973835 .0483787 .3334769 
bln 11 .0050933 .0050772 .0000266 .0141789 
cln 11 .1989533 .2578019 .000676 .7782077 
nibc 11 –.0010799 .126562 –.2259798 .1721745 
niexp 11 .2918341 .4316285 .0025303 1.538723 
roa 11 .0177888 .0065548 .0088084 .0323878 
la 11 .1754326 .1451123 .0539849 .5837538 
1q
. 2
00
6 
lna 11 16.55343 1.744673 13.25364 18.93802 
dep 17 7579705 1.39e+07 34.5 4.91e+07 
ddep 17 122109.4 1037097 –1377754 3840035 
ir 17 .0256048 .0203758 0 .0660007 
ca 17 .1635013 .1056676 .0609689 .4274382 
bln 17 .0053271 .0065215 .0000103 .0242513 
cln 17 .1497671 .2341116 .0002814 .8651733 
nibc 17 –.0682751 .2323945 –.5886752 .3992877 
niexp 17 .052758 .0767198 –.0055345 .3264501 
roa 17 .0071402 .0044871 –.0000427 .0150565 
la 17 .1556705 .1058199 .0514363 .4877339 
2q
. 2
00
6 
lna 17 16.36745 1.888879 13.02657 19.07928 
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Panel D. Private domestic banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 401 920298.9 2825899 88 2.97e+07 
ddep 401 –26900.3 353380 –5828437 2071264 
ir 401 .0652927 .0461619 .0001019 .6747258 
ca 401 .2672844 .1473026 .0521134 .8917158 
bln 401 .0130065 .0427687 0 .5521721 
cln 401 .0878511 .1096374 .000108 .6893716 
nibc 401 –.0160746 .0984021 –.620933 .4716712 
niexp 401 .0373183 .2324743 –.2040651 4.457994 
roa 401 .0156546 .0145309 –.0178486 .160392 
la 401 .2154434 .1435632 .0164097 .9984988 
3q
. 2
00
4 
lna 401 13.6447 1.762669 8.155649 19.26075 
dep 398 1034118 2998798 592 2.90e+07 
ddep 398 153759.4 526339.6 –1092509 6959058 
ir 398 .0806896 .0393996 .0001034 .6220725 
ca 398 .2388034 .1369352 .0076326 .8490604 
bln 398 .0130003 .0450449 0 .5107955 
cln 398 .0958268 .1176217 .0001002 .6906264 
nibc 398 –.0102082 .0937849 –.6705407 .6167986 
niexp 398 .0482176 .3329401 –.2708086 6.413497 
roa 398 .0239701 .0210172 –.1549579 .1694834 
la 398 .2134476 .1482384 .0048782 1.006089 
4q
. 2
00
4 
lna 398 13.79006 1.726043 8.03301 19.28673 
dep 415 1138846 3382670 120 3.25e+07 
ddep 415 130501.4 577082.2 –1232967 8305866 
ir 415 .0203212 .0088855 0 .093687 
ca 415 .2395523 .1458819 .0131826 .9416423 
bln 415 .0120509 .0393518 0 .4131097 
cln 415 .0990065 .1236393 0 .6990811 
nibc 415 –.0118135 .1090859 –.7286949 .4462167 
niexp 415 .0614242 .3008039 –.3599024 5.541764 
roa 415 .0287839 .0233839 –.1125933 .1699864 
la 415 .2349447 .1537146 .0029436 1.30724 
1q
. 2
00
5 
lna 415 13.83195 1.740826 8.109826 19.45872 
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Panel D. Private domestic banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 449 1138021 3496042 138 3.64e+07 
ddep 449 63717.17 509049 –8010211 3993267 
ir 449 .040847 .0166735 0 .1519327 
ca 449 .2237575 .138688 .0144276 .9052234 
bln 449 .0113862 .0357844 0 .4020711 
cln 449 .1039246 .1251504 .0000491 .7727023 
nibc 449 –.0105316 .1097679 –.6381338 .7323637 
niexp 449 .0158443 .0499477 –.0334381 .7376384 
roa 449 .007465 .0095146 –.0189565 .1256776 
la 449 .2317079 .1438793 .0219529 1.233397 
2q
. 2
00
5 
lna 449 13.81982 1.741083 8.304248 19.67288 
dep 450 1160076 3743587 15 4.05e+07 
ddep 450 129402.3 1101271 –1838927 2.19e+07 
ir 450 .0625002 .0400871 0 .5258216 
ca 450 .2232222 .1368119 .0352837 .8923106 
bln 450 .0116637 .0366491 0 .3792491 
cln 450 .1064402 .1227418 .0000843 .7319489 
nibc 450 –.0135685 .1251455 –.7263687 .8229215 
niexp 450 .0266852 .0889447 –.0871598 1.303705 
roa 450 .0143648 .0151427 –.0478444 .141252 
la 450 .2152007 .1475746 .0110567 .9498737 
3q
. 2
00
5 
lna 450 13.83507 1.686608 8.369621 19.7186 
dep 447 1302877 4272029 8 4.51e+07 
ddep 447 136718.5 724691.9 –1575550 1.04e+07 
ir 447 .0810233 .0526183 0 .6369784 
ca 447 .2202204 .1443352 .0133793 .9895038 
bln 447 .0115908 .0369368 0 .4026283 
cln 447 .1114986 .12289 .0000533 .7329784 
nibc 447 –.0171456 .1300232 –.883733 .8910223 
niexp 447 .0420498 .1399872 –.1194271 2.058431 
roa 447 .0220956 .025414 –.1767864 .2614457 
la 447 .2103548 .1597844 .0129681 1.448546 
4q
. 2
00
5 
lna 447 13.9095 1.702605 8.337349 19.77829 
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Panel D. Private domestic banks 
 Variable 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dep 449 1420017 4759890 1 5.94e+07 
ddep 449 62502.5 484806.8 –6287358 5218399 
ir 449 .0217703 .008657 0 .0862796 
ca 449 .2094484 .1332567 .0373898 .8672795 
bln 449 .0113232 .0378977 0 .3966099 
cln 449 .1167885 .1254936 .0000243 .7368334 
nibc 449 –.0118535 .1230255 –.886369 .8126496 
niexp 449 .0617173 .2276337 –.3309897 3.613013 
roa 449 .0286624 .0399525 –.2175769 .5166391 
la 449 .2194988 .1526958 .0173475 .9700304 
1q
. 2
00
6 
lna 449 13.99496 1.686905 9.537303 19.81 
dep 478 1489278 4757863 1 6.06e+07 
ddep 478 95407.83 559374 –3272471 1.03e+07 
ir 478 .0436516 .0198017 0 .3001061 
ca 478 .2035288 .1391829 .0355217 .8123338 
bln 478 .0087953 .0270656 0 .3323056 
cln 478 .1181578 .1248033 .0000112 .6989276 
nibc 478 –.0032229 .1120299 –.6876813 .8239527 
niexp 478 .0158575 .0851292 –.0542265 1.528013 
roa 478 .008145 .0227121 –.0179305 .346819 
la 478 .2046742 .1445745 .0193348 .8492058 
2q
. 2
00
6 
lna 478 14.10207 1.705015 8.381145 19.92319 
Table 22. All deposits, market discipline  
Panel A. Deposit growth 
All banks State banks Foreign banks Private domestic banks 
Model 
Random effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z   coefficient z 
ca 820896.9 1.49 –4.50e+07 –1.19   67240.25 0.72 
bln 1247782 0.58 1.31e+09 2.07**   315607.2 0.99 
cln 1062234 1.62 4.92e+07 3.04*   217781.4 2.17** 
nibc –66592.62 –0.14 4.55e+07 1.49   –147017.6 –1.49 
niexp –63471.72 –0.22 –4.84e+07 –1.29   –46781.8 –0.83 
roa –720737.8 –0.38 8.07e+07 0.26   –870201.4 –1.84*** 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
51
Panel A. Deposit growth 
All banks State banks Foreign banks Private domestic banks 
Model 
Random effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z   coefficient z 
la 342711.4 0.72 1.94e+07 1.02   117050.6 1.40 
lna 363498.2 5.78* 5434256 4.96*   94545.61 11.09* 
infl 26366.8 0.92 2944514 1.37   5813.661 0.68 
income 107.271 1.84*** 2133.535 0.54   53.83653 3.02* 
de 70388.96 0.92 858057.2 0.17   31346.68 1.36 
ee 87275.44 1.34 –2566047 –0.58   51319.06 2.62* 
_cons –1.11e+07 –2.71* –3.84e+07 –0.15   –4375269 –3.68* 
A 42.02* 52.75* 0.2173 179.46 
B 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.3063 0.0000* 
C 0.0000* 0.0012* 0.0651*** 0.0000* 
D 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.4902 0.0000* 
E 0.5728 – – 0.2310 
Number of 
observations 3639 71 81 3487 
 
Panel B. Interest rate 
All banks State banks Foreign banks Private domestic banks 
Model 
Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics coefficient z coefficient t-statistics 
ca –.0177162 –1.73 –.1631586 –2.15** –.0988635 –2.58* –.0180082 –1.71*** 
bln –.0603618 –1.55 1.178173 1.15 –.0939338 –0.33 –.0633541 –1.60 
cln –.008864 –0.67 –.1177634 –0.89 .004143 0.21 –.0081702 –0.60 
nibc –.0046133 –0.64 –.0205793 –0.49 .005193 0.39 –.004745 –0.63 
niexp .0014871 0.33 –.0110126 –0.26 .0080969 0.81 .0005603 0.12 
roa .013304 0.49 .2548603 0.65 –.0317791 –0.41 .0149183 0.53 
la .027397 3.33* –.0599143 –0.89 –.0297193 –1.17 .0292471 3.46* 
lna .0002817 0.10 –.0235532 –1.12 –.0094893 –3.55* .0006779 0.23 
infl –.0068139 –16.78* –.00431 –1.95*** –.0027361 –2.19** –.0069624 –16.55* 
income .0000217 26.62* .0000193 5.37* .0000113 4.34* .0000219 25.99* 
de .0360801 32.83* .0288042 4.75* .0162685 4.80* .0366411 32.13* 
ee .0194299 20.27* .0096014 2.02** .0086484 2.74* .0198239 19.97* 
_cons –1.79867 –22.51* –.8194979 –1.41 –.6370285 –3.24* –1.834889 –22.20* 
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Panel B. Interest rate 
All banks State banks Foreign banks Private domestic banks 
Model 
Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics coefficient z coefficient t-statistics 
A 0.4153 0.7255 72.56 0.4153 
B 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
C 0.0000* 0.0102** 0.0000* 0.0000* 
D 0.0000* 0.2535 0.0000* 0.0000* 
E 0.0000* – 0.6589 0.0000* 
Number of 
observations 3639 71 81 3487 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
A — R^2 (pooled)/R^2-within (fixed effects)/Wald chi^2 (random effects). 
B — F-test for joint significance (p-value). 
C — F-test for fixed effects (p-value). 
D — Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects (p-value). 
E — Hausman specification test (p-value). 
Table 23. Disciplining by quantity: all deposits, the influence of DIS (Dependant variable: deposit growth) 
All banks State banks 
Model 
Random effects Random effects 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z 
ca 432467.9 0.66 –4.09e+07 –0.60 
bln 915078.8 0.41 2.02e+09 0.92 
cln 724180 0.89 1.95e+07 0.49 
nibc –256416.8 –0.37 3977327 0.05 
niexp 101332.2 0.31 –1.31e+08 –0.62 
roa 2369793 0.65 1.41e+08 0.20 
la 235170.2 0.40 4558068 0.08 
lna 278682.5 3.84* 6264308 1.76*** 
infl –9170.532 –0.06 –2020995 –0.18 
income 66.94958 0.59 –2992.959 –0.20 
de –50993.88 –0.16 –6315885 –0.37 
ee 91926.86 0.59 3186307 0.19 
dis –4.13e+07 –1.73** 4.67e+08 0.30 
dis*ca 654393.8 1.01 –6.23e+07 –0.65 
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All banks State banks 
Model 
Random effects Random effects 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z 
dis*bln 605097.8 0.29 4.58e+07 0.02 
dis*cln 453684.6 0.68 5.65e+07 1.22 
dis*nibc 236167.4 0.33 7.44e+07 0.85 
dis*niexp –391438.5 –0.73 8.54e+07 0.40 
dis*roa –4149186 –1.07 –1.01e+08 –0.12 
dis*la 121854.3 0.22 2.45e+07 0.41 
dis*lna 139355.1 2.56* –1133862 –0.30 
dis*infl 5569.196 0.04 6711436 0.52 
dis*income 414.351 1.49 3922.808 0.32 
dis*de 516822.6 1.29 – – 
dis*ee 614067.9 1.43 –1.41e+07 –0.33 
_cons –6208382 –0.74 – – 
R^2 (pooled)/R^2-within (fixed effects)/Wald 
chi^2 (random effects) 51.98* 61.74* 
F-test for joint significance (p-value) 0.0012* 0.0000* 
F-test for fixed effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0091* 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
for random effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0001*** 
Hausman specification test (p-value) 0.6840 – 
Number of observations 3639 71 
 
Foreign banks Private domestic banks 
Model 
Pooled Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
ca 1561679 0.29 72808.87 0.30 
bln 2.90e+07 1.13 –158985.4 –0.19 
cln 2423374 1.20 94544.69 0.29 
nibc –2424431 –1.33 –168151.9 –0.76 
niexp 3049374 4.37* 62897.47 0.55 
roa 330704.6 0.04 1813919 1.58 
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Foreign banks Private domestic banks 
Model 
Pooled Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
la 1632719 0.99 98037.59 0.48 
lna 224049.3 0.89 –72555.42 –1.11 
infl 1223913 0.41 –2925.062 –0.07 
income 1163.226 0.48 52.83214 1.58 
de 1561525 0.29 –73240.74 –0.77 
ee –1896508 –0.54 45546.81 0.98 
dis – – –8218625 –1.12 
dis*ca –2831031 –0.51 124337.6 0.62 
dis*bln –3.97e+07 –1.40 –57776.11 –0.09 
dis*cln –2986896 –1.43 59163.96 0.27 
dis*nibc 2305065 1.18 –150895.8 –0.69 
dis*niexp –2677681 –3.26* 40162.23 0.22 
dis*roa –184648.7 –0.02 –2887051 –2.43** 
dis*la –2694243 –1.33 –25418.41 –0.15 
dis*lna –221146.3 –0.84 30976.19 1.75*** 
dis*infl –1188412 –0.40 –6335.111 –0.14 
dis*income –1246.571 –0.66 36.88377 0.44 
dis*de –1652315 –0.34 173593.5 1.44 
dis*ee 1780246 0.40 76723.38 0.58 
_cons 7758083 0.14 1088271 0.39 
R^2 (pooled)/R^2-within (fixed effects)/Wald 
chi^2 (random effects) 0.5106 0.0152 
F-test for joint significance (p-value) 0.0032* 0.0090* 
F-test for fixed effects (p-value) 0.2240 0.0000* 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
for random effects (p-value) 0.3932 0.0000* 
Hausman specification test (p-value) – 0.0000* 
Number of observations 81 3487 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Table 24. Disciplining by price: all deposits, the influence of DIS (Dependant variable: interest rate) 
All banks State banks 
Model 
Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
ca –.0156674 –1.43 –.1042782 –1.08 
bln –.0683337 –1.76*** 2.803535 1.17 
cln –.0322534 –2.19** .1582104 0.85 
nibc –.0193324 –1.94*** .0689178 0.74 
niexp .0049878 0.96 –.0013525 –0.01 
roa –.0313045 –0.61 .398714 0.47 
la .0148554 1.61 –.0927332 –0.89 
lna –.0013066 –0.44 .0047912 0.16 
infl –.0024471 –1.21 –.0409717 –3.25* 
income .0000218 14.11* –.0000556 –1.76*** 
de .0402205 9.16* – – 
ee .0148123 6.90* .1139584 2.37** 
dis –1.892136 –5.72* – – 
dis*ca –.0225939 –2.46** –.1471019 –1.47 
dis*bln .0374124 1.27 1.04341 0.48 
dis*cln .0338914 3.64* –.0310356 –0.68 
dis*nibc .0200612 2.02** –.1017594 –1.13 
dis*niexp –.0076343 –0.98 .0207654 0.10 
dis*roa .0542568 1.02 –.8345415 –0.99 
dis*la .0204862 2.61* .025815 0.41 
dis*lna .0029487 3.93* –.001991 –0.54 
dis*infl –.0061571 –2.95* .034494 2.95* 
dis*income .0000203 5.31* .0000971 2.09** 
dis*de .0153807 2.80* .058174 3.27* 
dis*ee .0363916 6.09* –.063276 –2.90* 
_cons –1.735999 –13.73* –3.681812 –2.07** 
R^2 (pooled)/R^2-within (fixed effects)/Wald 
chi^2 (random effects) 0.4339 0.7932 
F-test for joint significance 0.0000* 0.0000* 
F-test for fixed effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0140** 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
for random effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.2143 
Hausman specification test (p-value) 0.0000* – 
Number of observations 3639 71 
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Foreign banks Private domestic banks 
Model 
Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
ca –.1375465 –1.41 –.0176426 –1.57 
bln –.7805441 –1.26 –.070459 –1.79*** 
cln .0039182 0.05 –.0364298 –2.38** 
nibc .0518384 1.32 –.020913 –2.01** 
niexp –.0022827 –0.12 .0047432 0.89 
roa –.1407949 –0.76 –.0396764 –0.73 
la –.0693052 –1.59 .0152507 1.60 
lna –.0104883 –0.61 –.0008196 –0.27 
infl –.0070583 –0.11 –.0025103 –1.22 
income –6.25e–06 –0.12 .000022 13.97* 
de .0005933 0.00 .0408831 9.13* 
ee .0232273 0.30 .015234 6.97* 
dis – – –1.955055 –5.70* 
dis*ca .0879124 0.75 –.0202015 –2.14** 
dis*bln .9304847 1.48 .0362235 1.21 
dis*cln –.001906 –0.04 .0415349 4.06* 
dis*nibc –.0624457 –1.49 .0226723 2.20** 
dis*niexp –.0031058 –0.18 –.0092472 –1.09 
dis*roa .3367375 1.39 .0597175 1.07 
dis*la .0527526 1.09 .0226299 2.75* 
dis*lna .005783 1.07 .0035012 4.22* 
dis*infl .0043755 0.07 –.0062918 –2.95* 
dis*income .0000183 0.44 .0000208 5.26* 
dis*de .0159876 0.15 .0159344 2.82* 
dis*ee –.0202561 –0.21 .0373865 6.03* 
_cons –.5469661 –0.38 –1.776313 –13.6*7 
R^2 (pooled)/R^2-within (fixed effects)/Wald 
chi^2 (random effects) 0.6707 0.4384 
F-test for joint significance 0.0003* 0.0000* 
F-test for fixed effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
for random effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Hausman specification test (p-value) – 0.0000* 
Number of observations 81 3487 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Table 25. Maturity distribution, summary statistics 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
On-call deposits 3293 449806.4 4116507 2 113000000 
Growth of on-call deposits 3293 –33293.66 1472471 –73700000 12300000 
Short-term deposits 3293 460561.3 5426054 –38819 129000000 
Growth of short-term deposits 3293 –12389.76 421281 –13700000 4856817 
Long-term deposits 3293 3875681 5.55e+07 34 1400000000 
2q
. 2
00
4 
Growth of long-term deposits 3293 314115 4074467 –7631663 115000000 
On-call deposits 379 579657.6 5875087 25 113000000 
Growth of on-call deposits 379 –81069.94 1715740 –33100000 3156533 
Short-term deposits 379 517503.4 6636677 –38750.5 129000000 
Growth of short-term deposits 379 –66931.17 721184.5 –13700000 533806 
Long-term deposits 379 3050854 4.41e+07 64.5 858000000 
3q
. 2
00
4 
Growth of long-term deposits 379 235253.1 4304085 –5171346 83200000 
On-call deposits 378 575157.1 5110574 5 97500000 
Growth of on-call deposits 378 42231.04 220529.5 –2072055 1755222 
Short-term deposits 378 494336.5 6055320 –38276 118000000 
Growth of short-term deposits 378 2209.582 574364.3 –10800000 1165168 
Long-term deposits 378 3358291 4.82e+07 175.5 935000000 
4q
. 2
00
4 
Growth of long-term deposits 378 310229.1 3624003 –820693 69900000 
On-call deposits 397 617804.1 5113263 38 98800000 
Growth of on-call deposits 397 29929.45 244294.2 –367165 4063768 
Short-term deposits 397 490761.8 5702112 –38795.5 113000000 
Growth of short-term deposits 397 13217.22 251817.4 –3024075 2792956 
Long-term deposits 397 3505882 5.02e+07 206.5 998000000 
1q
. 2
00
5 
Growth of long-term deposits 397 274689.5 2841518 –570906 55800000 
On-call deposits 429 533061.5 5165595 11 105000000 
Growth of on-call deposits 429 –10395.64 822364.7 –9636540 12300000 
Short-term deposits 429 463165.1 5575842 –38819 115000000 
Growth of short-term deposits 429 –11616.73 228212.3 –3692575 632729 
Long-term deposits 429 3508916 5.13e+07 68 1060000000 
2q
. 2
00
5 
Growth of long-term deposits 429 301694.6 3358408 –1031081 67900000 
On-call deposits 423 424539.5 3738121 41.5 74500000 
Growth of on-call deposits 423 –199435.6 3602723 –73700000 4092823 
Short-term deposits 423 436239 5153085 –15804.5 106000000 
Growth of short-term deposits 423 –16390.56 412623.4 –7653860 2180312 
Long-term deposits 423 3813296 5.46e+07 34 1120000000 
3q
. 2
00
5 
Growth of long-term deposits 423 333635.4 3200601 –1314412 62300000 
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 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
On-call deposits 420 309460.3 2031895 56 36900000 
Growth of on-call deposits 420 –35724.49 552319.1 –7450621 6353985 
Short-term deposits 420 446284.2 5060572 –35884.5 103000000 
Growth of short-term deposits 420 1553.548 472112 –7866221 4856817 
Long-term deposits 420 4241747 5.92e+07 86.5 1210000000 
4q
. 2
00
5 
Growth of long-term deposits 420 451559 5655545 –621439 115000000 
On-call deposits 420 283179.7 1956054 2 35300000 
Growth of on-call deposits 420 –13975.21 328993.7 –6025668 1236154 
Short-term deposits 420 431058.7 4653981 –37987 94700000 
Growth of short-term deposits 420 –16429.36 248386.4 –4381176 685180 
Long-term deposits 420 4600072 6.41e+07 69 1310000000 
1q
. 2
00
6 
Growth of long-term deposits 420 272319.2 3904977 –7631663 79400000 
On-call deposits 447 316939.9 2027097 2 34300000 
Growth of on-call deposits 447 6575.002 239156.2 –2777828 3647839 
Short-term deposits 447 418550.3 4554955 –38434.5 95700000 
Growth of short-term deposits 447 –7495.306 228168.9 –2400713 3277942 
Long-term deposits 447 4727428 6.64e+07 584 1400000000 
2q
. 2
00
6 
Growth of long-term deposits 447 322858.9 4862917 –6910699 102000000 
Table 26. Maturity shifts■ 
All banks 
On-call deposits Short-term deposits Long-term deposits Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z coefficient z 
ca –272472.1 –1.13 –150688.8 –2.21** 2133194 3.30* 
bln –388527.7 –0.49 –188617.7 –0.85 2898632 1.37 
cln –351734.1 –1.63 –199890 –3.26* 2668766 4.60* 
nibc –233884.1 –0.99 –140195.8 –2.10** 1103361 1.74*** 
niexp 140729.1 1.05 53921.43 1.42 –659672.3 –1.84*** 
roa 88947.84 0.08 174548.3 0.55 –2643827 –0.88 
la –168746.8 –0.83 –84333.98 –1.46 1095729 2.01** 
lna –96092.67 –5.23* –46448.82 –8.92* 715308.3 14.50* 
infl 25377.91 1.21 5914.092 1.00 5300.241 0.09 
income 55.02659 1.26 20.03138 1.62 34.74382 0.30 
de –29864.13 –0.53 –14296.51 –0.89 167188.1 1.10 
ee 48489.65 1.01 9298.344 0.69 35630.13 0.28 
_cons 105150.2 0.04 621455.9 0.76 –1.69e+07 –2.17** 
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All banks 
On-call deposits Short-term deposits Long-term deposits Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z coefficient z 
R^2  0.0112 0.0287 0.0695 
Chi^2 37.19 97.16 245.94 
P-value 0.0002 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Number of obs. 3293 
 
 
State banks ■■ 
Short-term deposits Long-term deposits Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z 
ca 4517503 0.94 –6.37e+07 –1.50 
bln –1.82e+08 –2.34** 2.04e+09 2.98* 
cln –4902614 –2.43** 6.90e+07 3.87* 
nibc –4853705 –1.28 6.59e+07 1.97** 
niexp 8155700 1.57 –8.38e+07 –1.83*** 
roa –1.29e+07 –0.31 9.04e+07 0.24 
la –2185356 –0.95 3.16e+07 1.55 
lna –573937.2 –4.21* 7362988 5.72* 
infl 125732.7 0.44 1949404 0.78 
income 163.2079 0.36 –296.574 –0.07 
de –746941.8 –1.23 2752419 0.51 
ee –184088.1 –0.36 –2529926 –0.56 
_cons 3.49e+07 1.12 –1.03e+08 –0.38 
R^2  0.4268 0.6985 
Chi^2 44.68 89.45 
P-value 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Number of obs. 60 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
■ — There are no maturity shifts for foreign banks (p-value = 0.5739 and 0.6068 for short-term and long-term deposits respectively) 
or private domestic banks (p-value = 0.1269 and 0.3064 for on-call and short-term deposits respectively). 
■■ — Regression for on-call deposits is insignificant (p-value = 0.4089). 
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Table 27. Maturity shifts for deposit shares, state banks■ 
On-call deposits Short-term deposits 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z 
ca .2771895 1.97** .0053573 0.07 
bln –5.489607 –2.40** –.4726715 –0.39 
cln .1002477 1.69*** .0273978 0.88 
nibc –.0003273 –0.00 .0609373 1.04 
niexp .0508009 0.33 –.0646331 –0.80 
roa .3770929 0.31 .8890384 1.37 
la –.1795425 –2.65* .0172533 0.48 
lna –.0008382 –0.21 .0027421 1.30 
infl –.0001206 –0.01 .0027337 0.62 
income 4.17e–06 0.31 –3.73e–06 –0.52 
de –.0239435 –1.35 –.0205817 –2.19* 
ee –.0087103 –0.57 –.0003237 –0.04 
_cons .9464383 1.04 .5428712 1.13 
R^2  0.2682 0.2499 
Chi^2 21.99 19.98 
P-value 0.0376** 0.0674* 
Number of observations 60 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
■ — There are no maturity shifts for long-term deposits (p-value = 0.2821). 
Table 28. Maturity shifts for deposit shares: all banks, foreign banks, private domestic banks 
  Number of obs. R^2 Chi^2 P-value 
On-call deposits 3293 0.0027 8.77 0.7222 
Short-term deposits 3293 0.0053 17.71 0.1248 
All banks 
Long-term deposits 3293 0.0041 13.58 0.3283 
On-call deposits 68 0.1120 8.58 0.7385 
Short-term deposits 68 0.1186 9.15 0.6900 
Foreign banks 
Long-term deposits 68 0.2227 19.49 0.0775*** 
On-call deposits 3165 0.0029 9.10 0.6944 
Short-term deposits 3165 0.0055 17.47 0.1328 
Private domestic banks 
Long-term deposits 3165 0.0043 13.72 0.3187 
*** — Significant at 10% confidence level. 
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Table 29. Maturity shifts, the influence of DIS■ 
All banks 
On-call deposits Short-term deposits Long-term deposits Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z coefficient z 
ca –153919.1 –0.42 –203371.7 –1.94*** 1521489 1.53 
bln –227360.3 –0.21 –217657.6 –0.71 2138957 0.73 
cln –294027.7 –0.77 –353292.3 –3.29* 2474962 2.43** 
nibc –351692.9 –0.85 –264420.4 –2.25** 1597976 1.44 
niexp 93418.67 0.62 56878.77 1.34 –369708.2 –0.92 
roa 1060856 0.44 486303.7 0.71 –652554 –0.10 
la –108079.3 –0.33 –140269.4 –1.52 927790.9 1.06 
lna –55599.09 –1.81*** –70240.52 –8.06* 623078.3 7.54* 
infl –5531.61 –0.05 –4298.622 –0.14 86829.17 0.29 
income 30.58762 0.37 21.35554 0.92 –18.66334 –0.08 
de –77537 –0.33 –73759.58 –1.10 377447.3 0.59 
ee 32435.09 0.29 4430.04 0.14 101926.2 0.33 
dis –6501628 –0.37 –6535909 –1.31 –1.55e+07 –0.33 
dis*ca –263047.9 –0.54 76770.49 0.55 1361384 1.03 
dis*bln –199950 –0.13 36135.3 0.08 1055540 0.25 
dis*cln –64625.96 –0.14 223300.6 1.71*** 213185.5 0.17 
dis*nibc 189932.4 0.38 179751.4 1.26 –785348.9 –0.58 
dis*niexp 193222.7 0.57 12813.44 0.13 –1387049 –1.52 
dis*roa –1067764 –0.39 –419409 –0.54 –3389644 –0.46 
dis*la –92555.7 –0.22 77161.35 0.65 357157.7 0.32 
dis*lna –67267.19 –1.72*** 35067.03 3.17* 179369.5 1.71*** 
dis*infl 39754.6 0.35 2774.572 0.09 –107000.4 –0.35 
dis*income 127.0014 0.62 33.07009 0.57 230.1973 0.42 
dis*de 80223.33 0.27 112869.9 1.34 67570.63 0.08 
dis*ee 118938.5 0.38 72232.21 0.81 275799 0.33 
_cons 1689153 0.28 2881875 1.71*** –2.38e+07 –1.49 
R^2  0.0130 0.0338 0.0714 
Chi^2 43.39 115.29 253.23 
P-value 0.0127** 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Number of obs. 3293 
 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
62
State banks ■■ Private domestic banks ■■■ 
Short-term deposits Long-term deposits On-call deposits Long-term deposits Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z coefficient z coefficient z 
ca 6246214 0.88 –5.54e+07 –0.78 20021.04 0.24 12328.94 0.10 
bln –8.55e+08 –4.43* 5.22e+09 2.71* 24626.94 0.10 116722.9 0.32 
cln –4485423 –0.94 5.35e+07 1.12 –1769.396 –0.02 88210.74 0.65 
nibc –2.07e+07 –2.32** 1.57e+08 1.76*** –29586.31 –0.31 60258.28 0.42 
niexp 7.00e+07 3.69* –3.37e+08 –1.78*** –4062.922 –0.12 –29223.92 –0.57 
roa 4.02e+07 0.41 –8.45e+08 –0.86 211888.2 0.38 209088.2 0.24 
la –5994997 –0.91 7.67e+07 1.16 10286.89 0.14 81954.85 0.73 
lna –2042643 –6.35* 1.32e+07 4.11* 12253.12 1.68*** 57940.7 5.20* 
infl –558664.7 –1.01 5791007 0.49 –200.9873 –0.01 17174.59 0.45 
income 751.2977 0.32 –323.5938 –0.02 9.846877 0.54 26.94256 0.96 
de –1012156 –0.58 –3037752 –0.17 9816.473 0.19 25940.95 0.32 
ee –674086.7 –0.20 –3103754 –0.18 26894.83 1.07 33291.19 0.86 
dis –   1.79e+08 0.11 2628860 0.66 –1.31e+07 –2.15** 
dis*ca –1134037 –0.12 –7.14e+07 –0.74 –50802.22 –0.46 215643.6 1.28 
dis*bln 7.23e+08 3.38* –2.54e+09 –1.19 –95338.15 –0.27 406326.7 0.76 
dis*cln 26675.08 0.01 4.04e+07 0.77 –24402.87 –0.22 275061.1 1.64 
dis*nibc 1.87e+07 1.93*** –8.18e+07 –0.85 36873.31 0.32 –265610.4 –1.51 
dis*niexp –6.37e+07 –3.25* 2.58e+08 1.32 20658.64 0.26 –36085.25 –0.29 
dis*roa –8.04e+07 –0.72 1.22e+09 1.10 –237692.4 –0.38 –1869274 –1.94** 
dis*la 4494301 0.64 –3.86e+07 –0.55 –67670.92 –0.72 190182.2 1.32 
dis*lna 1670672 4.82* –6675422 –1.93*** –35728.06 –3.83* 93251.21 6.52* 
dis*infl 807587.7 1.47 –3987986 –0.30 –445.6112 –0.02 –33491.67 –0.86 
dis*income –1441.786 –0.36 597.2082 0.05 –13.3557 –0.29 94.55531 1.34 
dis*de –   –   –34373.51 –0.52 161025.4 1.58 
dis*ee –470770.6 –0.70 –2625081 –0.06 –29369.11 –0.41 188837.7 1.73*** 
_cons 7.92e+07 0.50 –   –1488682 –1.12 –2949884 –1.44 
R^2  0.2349 0.6279 0.0120 0.0100 
Chi^2 20.22 101.25 38.52 32.00 
P-value 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0032* 0.0090* 
Number of 
observations 60 3165 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
■ — There are no maturity shifts for foreign banks (p-value = 0.5695 and 0.6471 for short-term and long-term deposits respectively). 
■■ — Regression for on-call deposits is insignificant (p-value = 0.6840). 
■■■ — Regression for short-term deposits is insignificant (p-value = 0.1579). 
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Table 30. Maturity shifts for deposit shares: state banks, the influence of DIS 
On-call deposits Short-term deposits Long-term deposits 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z coefficient z 
ca .1550648 0.69 –.0895113 –0.76 –.0300818 –0.06 
bln –6.467505 –1.06 2.651204 0.83 –1.968313 –0.14 
cln .052441 0.35 .0053364 0.07 .1117241 0.33 
nibc –.1995986 –0.70 .3378383 2.29** .0303328 0.05 
niexp –.0980052 –0.16 –.3978963 –1.27 .2960191 0.22 
roa –.1723745 –0.06 2.170505 1.33 –3.468516 –0.50 
la –.0425759 –0.20 –.0598673 –0.55 .2156549 0.46 
lna .0100861 0.99 .0061322 1.15 .0034935 0.15 
infl –.0093551 –0.53 .0100065 1.09 –.0179817 –0.46 
income .0000677 0.91 –3.96e–06 –0.10 –.0003687 –2.23** 
de –.0969911 –1.75*** –.0244068 –0.85 .3458157 2.79* 
ee –.1151103 –1.06 –.0210401 –0.37 .6056047 2.49** 
dis –   –   –   
dis*ca .0048891 0.02 .1781673 1.12 –.7788768 –1.14 
dis*bln 1.547229 0.23 –4.45908 –1.26 20.23752 1.33 
dis*cln .1233926 0.74 –.0315556 –0.36 .1178572 0.32 
dis*nibc .4083771 1.33 –.3920954 –2.45** .0325158 0.05 
dis*niexp .2934305 0.47 .3169639 0.98 –1.588272 –1.14 
dis*roa –.2525064 –0.07 –1.061163 –0.58 2.747512 0.35 
dis*la –.1942618 –0.87 .0922341 0.80 .139458 0.28 
dis*lna –.0159773 –1.45 –.003379 –0.59 .0202666 0.82 
dis*infl .0234535 1.34 –.0086457 –0.95 .020448 0.52 
dis*income –.000099 –0.78 –.0000114 –0.17 .0006258 2.21** 
dis*de –   –   –   
dis*ee .0192849 0.90 .002801 0.25 –.1021595 –2.13** 
_cons 6.388957 1.27 1.358277 0.52 –29.57531 –2.64* 
R^2  0.4449 0.4454 0.3631 
Chi^2 48.08 48.18 34.20 
P-value 0.0016* 0.0016* 0.0623*** 
Number of obs. 60 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Table 31. Maturity shifts for deposit shares: all banks, foreign banks, private domestic banks 
   Number of obs. R^2 Chi^2 P-value 
On-call deposits 3293 0.0133 44.37 0.0098* 
Short-term deposits 3293 0.0073 24.28 0.5030 
All banks 
Long-term deposits 3293 0.0079 26.21 0.3967 
On-call deposits 68 0.2364 23.01 0.5767 
Short-term deposits 68 0.2079 18.60 0.8159 
Foreign banks 
Long-term deposits 68 0.4274 50.76 0.0011* 
On-call deposits 3165 0.0143 46.03 0.0064* 
Short-term deposits 3165 0.0076 24.18 0.5090 
Private 
domestic banks 
Long-term deposits 3165 0.0080 25.57 0.4306 
* — Significant at 1% confidence level. 
Table 32. Market discipline for groups of private domestic banks: all deposits, the influence of DIS (1st approach)  
Panel A. Deposit growth 
"Small" banks "Big" banks 
Model 
Random effects Random effects 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z 
ca 6678.833 0.42 72964.99 0.26 
bln –41840.37 –1.05 181747.6 0.21 
cln 63855.25 3.90* –122828.8 –0.32 
nibc –4910.27 –0.33 –101939.3 –0.29 
niexp –61683.96 –1.55 –48367.2 –0.54 
roa 35537.65 0.45 1398294 0.67 
la 3058.27 0.26 128516.1 0.45 
lna 10844.57 4.08* 140237 4.31* 
infl 2015.092 0.49 5956.071 0.08 
income 7.14467 2.42* 95.68006 1.63 
de –7200.216 –0.80 –37534.37 –0.23 
ee –88.44538 –0.02 119894 1.50 
dis –730419.3 –1.28 –2.68e+07 –1.95* 
dis*ca –4673.616 –0.28 296400.3 0.82 
dis*bln –4020.003 –0.09 –770883.3 –0.58 
dis*cln –1121.704 –0.07 628385.6 1.39 
dis*nibc –230.1655 –0.01 –323185.7 –0.75 
dis*niexp 68890.93 1.66*** –71986.52 –0.41 
dis*roa –52576.61 –0.58 –4207092 –1.87*** 
dis*la –37598.6 –3.10* 145650.6 0.40 
dis*lna –384.5745 –0.15 94576.63 2.34* 
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Panel A. Deposit growth 
"Small" banks "Big" banks 
Model 
Random effects Random effects 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z 
dis*infl –354.3653 –0.08 –37079.64 –0.47 
dis*income –.3505573 –0.05 191.0339 1.20 
dis*de 16641.32 1.56 408026.5 1.91*** 
dis*ee 7847.651 0.77 359888.6 1.44 
_cons 25222.4 0.11 –5936608 –1.45 
R^2 (pooled)/R^2-within (fixed 
effects)/Wald chi^2 (random effects) 160.22* 184.36* 
F-test for joint significance (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 
F-test for fixed effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0195** 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
test for random effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Hausman specification test (p-value) 0.7340 – 
Number of observations 1635 1852 
 
Panel B. Interest rate 
"Small" banks "Big" banks 
Model 
Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
ca –.0190924 –1.10 –.0014181 –0.10 
bln –.0586095 –1.28 –.1080268 –1.50 
cln .0695266 2.86* –.0227994 –1.08 
nibc –.0049064 –0.33 –.0031833 –0.32 
niexp .0137857 0.35 .0045934 1.37 
roa .0326643 0.44 –.0948906 –2.06** 
la .0263928 2.08** –.0404877 –2.70* 
lna .0149456 2.86* –.0095278 –2.88* 
infl –.0022949 –0.62 .0000235 0.01 
income .0000239 8.88* .0000198 11.64* 
de .0472026 5.79* .0374047 7.78* 
ee .0147642 3.90* .011263 4.71* 
dis –2.483594 –4.69* –1.129396 –3.71* 
dis*ca –.0398739 –2.58* .0400655 2.97* 
dis*bln .0501257 1.27 –.0996043 –2.74* 
dis*cln –.0000926 –0.01 .0054717 0.43 
dis*nibc .0174901 1.18 .0134708 1.36 
dis*niexp .0031666 0.08 –.0270554 –4.92* 
dis*roa .0101983 0.12 .0531461 1.14 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
66
Panel B. Interest rate 
"Small" banks "Big" banks 
Model 
Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
dis*la .006333 0.56 .0561808 3.62* 
dis*lna .0016835 0.70 .0012729 1.18 
dis*infl –.0087858 –2.32** –.0055513 –2.36** 
dis*income .0000226 3.71* .0000149 4.20* 
dis*de .0195623 2.02** .0044533 0.79 
dis*ee .0502507 5.32* .0249831 4.41* 
_cons –2.159247 –9.30* –1.388301 –10.62* 
R^2 (pooled)/R^2-within (fixed 
effects)/Wald chi^2 (random effects) 0.4660 0.4329 
F-test for joint significance (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 
F-test for fixed effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
test for random effects (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Hausman specification test (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Number of observations 1635 1852 
*, ** — Significant at 1%, 5% confidence level respectively. 
Table 33. Maturity shifts for groups of private domestic banks, the influence of deposit insurance (1st approach)  
 R^2 Chi^2 P-value 
"Small" banks, deposit growth 
On-call deposits 0.0192 27.92 0.3113 
Short-term deposits 0.0227 33.14 0.1277 
Long-term deposits 0.1606 272.70 0.0000* 
"Small" banks, share of deposits 
On-call deposits 0.0402 59.65 0.0001 
Short-term deposits 0.0161 23.32 0.5587 
Long-term deposits 0.0145 20.93 0.6967 
"Big" banks, deposit growth 
On-call deposits 0.0189 33.53 0.1183 
Short-term deposits 0.0183 32.41 0.1466 
Long-term deposits 0.1857 396.73 0.0000* 
"Big" banks, shares of deposits 
On-call deposits 0.0549 101.13 0.0000* 
Short-term deposits 0.0112 19.69 0.7630 
Long-term deposits 0.0089 15.59 0.9266 
* — Significant at 1% confidence level. 
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Table 34. Market discipline for groups of private domestic banks: all deposits, the influence of DIS 
Panel A. Deposit growth Panel B. Interest rate 
"Small" banks "Big" banks "Small" banks "Big" banks 
Model 
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Variable 
coefficient t-statistics coefficient z coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics
ca 44189.35 1.49 –1656195 –1.45 –.0287803 –2.23** –.0014181 –0.10 
bln –48954.84 –0.48 76590.94 0.03 –.0455886 –1.04 –.1080268 –1.50 
cln 103908.2 2.42** –599965.7 –0.57 .0462905 2.47** –.0227994 –1.08 
nibc 3768.739 0.13 202569.4 0.23 –.0209627 –1.68*** –.0031833 –0.32 
niexp 13342.36 0.28 32713.1 0.11 .0191407 0.93 .0045934 1.37 
roa 242647.8 1.60 3568621 0.81 –.0212594 –0.32 –.0948906 –2.06** 
la –10900.51 –0.45 –441651.7 –0.35 .0195554 1.84*** –.0404877 –2.70* 
lna 8739.335 0.96 279461 2.80* .016406 4.13* –.0095278 –2.88* 
infl 8277.46 1.52 –24619.66 –0.09 –.003584 –1.51 .0000235 0.01 
income 15.67064 3.75* 175.8449 0.85 .0000214 11.76* .0000198 11.64* 
de –1462.076 –0.12 –155746.9 –0.27 .0432667 8.31* .0374047 7.78* 
ee 2582.66 0.44 283027.8 0.99 .0175485 6.90* .011263 4.71* 
dis –316481.2 –0.33 –7.22e+07 –2.00** –2.671148 –6.46* –1.129396 –3.71* 
dis*ca 2211.948 0.09 1644484 1.11 –.021094 –1.95*** .0400655 2.97* 
dis*bln –12205.63 –0.15 –469104.5 –0.14 .0681293 1.94*** –.0996043 –2.74* 
dis*cln –85489.79 –3.15* 2123735 1.62 .0251407 2.13** .0054717 0.43 
dis*nibc –716.6978 –0.03 –1240462 –1.09 .0265029 2.15** .0134708 1.36 
dis*niexp 5789.875 0.12 –48527.03 –0.11 –.0154708 –0.71 –.0270554 –4.92* 
dis*roa –240783.4 –1.45 –6897309 –1.41 –.0079118 –0.11 .0531461 1.14 
dis*la –67826.95 –3.23* 1676863 1.04 .020902 2.28** .0561808 3.62* 
dis*lna –3741.121 –1.15 126415 1.04 .0041093 2.89* .0012729 1.18 
dis*infl –6351.433 –1.12 –84993.42 –0.30 –.0070164 –2.85* –.0055513 –2.36** 
dis*income –8.097438 –0.75 578.5309 1.35 .0000268 5.67* .0000149 4.20* 
dis*de 7003.002 0.46 1098575 1.60 .0246959 3.70* .0044533 0.79 
dis*ee 7711.824 0.45 989387.6 1.49 .0493441 6.63* .0249831 4.41* 
_cons –294639.2 –0.82 –1.08e+07 –0.82 –2.151572 –13.75* –1.388301 –10.62* 
R^2 (pooled)/R^2-within 
(fixed effects)/Wald 
chi^2 (random effects) 0.0451 82.02* 0.4299 0.8024 
F-test for joint 
significance (p-value) 0.0000* 0.0508*** 0.0000* 0.0000* 
F-test for fixed effects  
(p-value) 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier  
test for random effects  
(p-value) 0.0000* 0.0075* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Hausman specification 
test (p-value) 0.0000* – 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Number of observations 2786 701 2786 701 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Table 35. Maturity shifts for "small" private domestic banks: the influence of DIS (2nd approach) 
On-call deposits Short-term deposits Long-term deposits 
Variable 
coefficient z coefficient z coefficient z 
ca –1485.703 –0.13 –5857.741 –2.73* –15855.04 –0.96 
bln 3812.588 0.11 1331.738 0.24 8237.476 0.16 
cln 3854.837 0.32 –580.298 –0.28 60252.97 3.35* 
nibc –808.0305 –0.06 –2804.619 –0.78 31368.81 1.62 
niexp –1893.46 –0.39 8984.138 0.99 –6430.194 –0.89 
roa –2965.672 –0.04 29977.25 1.84*** 9104.792 0.07 
la 2035.484 0.21 –1104.18 –0.63 –11129.37 –0.78 
lna 1367.69 1.00 –791.8264 –1.66*** 13670.43 6.66* 
infl 3162.869 0.95 –908.1273 –0.93 5695.316 1.14 
income 2.844037 1.14 .2173156 0.33 10.72086 2.87* 
de 8114.35 1.12 –3493.584 –1.66*** 5647.189 0.52 
ee 2280.463 0.67 619.1936 0.68 3306.373 0.65 
dis 1333998 2.38** –7816.148 –0.07 –1633372 –1.95*** 
dis*ca –2143.803 –0.15 8951.938 3.40* –22073.82 –1.00 
dis*bln –11960.5 –0.24 –6736.335 –0.96 64397.43 0.87 
dis*cln –11902.43 –0.81 1974.54 0.79 –12737.83 –0.58 
dis*nibc 4021.331 0.26 2840.747 0.74 –20662.92 –0.88 
dis*niexp 19984.7 1.32 –11249.06 –1.04 –26200.43 –1.15 
dis*roa –102739.6 –1.07 –32412.61 –1.85*** –180479 –1.26 
dis*la –22851.18 –1.86*** 762.785 0.32 –32263.46 –1.75*** 
dis*lna –6340.207 –3.60* 620.6387 0.96 4145.971 1.57 
dis*infl –587.9763 –0.17 965.6165 0.97 –4945.192 –0.96 
dis*income –10.40371 –1.61 –1.282186 –0.92 7.461988 0.77 
dis*de –24583 –2.66* 2929.362 1.21 20963.85 1.52 
dis*ee –13400.34 –1.34 –2291.171 –1.10 27567.89 1.84*** 
_cons –358872.1 –1.90*** 90829.78 1.70*** –526897.8 –1.86*** 
R^2  0.0313 0.0201 0.1402 
Chi^2 80.36 51.01 404.86 
P-value 0.0000* 0.0016* 0.0000* 
Number of obs. 2483 
*, **, *** — Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level respectively. 
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Table 36. Maturity shifts for "big" private domestic banks and "small" private domestic banks (deposit shares): the in-
fluence of DIS (2nd approach) 
 R^2 Chi^2 P-value 
"Big" banks, deposit growth 
On-call deposits 0.0283 19.88 0.7529 
Short-term deposits 0.0389 27.57 0.3280 
Long-term deposits 0.2113 182.68 0.0000 
"Small" banks 
On-call deposits 0.0235 59.75 0.0001* 
Short-term deposits 0.0084 21.02 0.6915 
Long-term deposits 0.0104 26.00 0.4075 
"Big" banks, shares of deposits 
On-call deposits 0.0997 75.54 0.0000* 
Short-term deposits 0.0123 8.52 0.9991 
Long-term deposits 0.0316 22.23 0.6226 
* — Significant at 1% confidence level. 
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Fig. 7a. Maturity structure change over time, "small" private domestic banks (assets less than 5 mln. euro) 
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Fig. 7b. Maturity structure change over time, "big" private domestic banks (assets over 5 mln. euro) 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
3q.2004 4q.2004 1q.2005 2q.2005 3q.2005 4q.2005 1q.2006 2q.2006
long-term deposits
short-term deposits
on-call deposits
 
Fig. 8a. Maturity structure change over time, "small" private domestic banks (80%) 
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Fig. 8b. Maturity structure change over time, "big" private domestic banks (20%) 
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A3. Interest rate — Maturity structure Hypothesis 
Table 37. Interest rate — Maturity structure Hypothesis (fixed effects) 
 Coefficient t P-value 
Share of on-call deposits –0.1179363 –0.16 0.871 
Share of short-term deposits (dropped)   
Share of long-term deposits 20.13641 1.21 0.227 
_cons –9.429569 –0.82 0.410 
R^2-within  0.0005 
F-test for fixed effects (p-value) 0.0000* 
P-value 0.4722 
Number of observations 3307 
* — Significant at 1% confidence level 
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